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“Every Man a Brick!”

The Status of Military Training in American Universities

BY

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
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


A NAVAL UNIT OF THE R. O. T. C.

(Courtesy of the American Legion Monthly)

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NOTHING "PRUSSIANISTIC," HERE

(Courtesy of American Legion Monthly)

FOREWORD

The teaching of Military Science is a feature of our institutions of higher learning of more than two generations' standing. Knowledge of the facts concerning its history and present status and concerning its methods and purposes is not as widely diffused as might be desired. This study has been undertaken for the purpose of finding and setting forth a few salient facts concerning these matters. The hope is ventured that the study may result in the exposition of facts which may serve to allay acrimonious differences of opinion in certain quarters which seem to be based on a slender foundation of fact. If it does contribute to the harmonization of opinion on this subject, its purpose will have been achieved.

M. M. C.

April 15, 1927.

PUBLISHER'S PREFACE

"Where are your walls?" asked a traveler in ancient Sparta. The king took his visitor to the great drill fields outside the city and, pointing to the ranks of disciplined troops, replied—



"There are the walls of Sparta—every man a brick!"

The Spartans made the mistake of stressing military service above the other civic and ethical duties. Their lack of other vital civic virtues caused their fall.

Our nation adopted and is maintaining a policy in which the obligation for military service is regarded as only one of the duties of the able-bodied citizen. In fact, many institutions maintained for the education and training of the future citizens of this nation stress military training less than any other civic duty.

Centuries ago Machiavelli showed the folly of depending on mercenaries for military service, a folly illustrated by British experience with Hessian troops during our Revolution and by northern experience with "bounty jumpers" during our Civil War.

Other historical records teach the folly of buying off national enemies with money instead of combating them with force.

The young men who form the Reserve Officers Training Corps in our universities and colleges realize that there is much to learn about the military duties of a citizen. One of their marching songs during the summer camps a few years ago was




*"Mystery! Mystery!
—Wonder how they'll ever
Make a soldier out of me!
For when I drill
I'm as awkward as can be!
For I'm a member
Of the R. O. T. C.!"*

Students of education will find a professional interest in the author's discussion of the value of advanced studies in military science as academic training. This is developed by Mr. Chambers as one of at least three fields worthy of investigation. A pleasant surprise and much inspiration await schoolmen who are not personally familiar with the habits of thought and methods of instruction employed by the better scholars in military science—particularly, the courses worked out by the military service in training men to think clearly and logically.

In another chapter devoted to a discussion of "Constructive Versus Destructive Efforts Toward Education for Peace," the fair-minded seeker after truth will be justified in giving the author his close attention. Here Mr. Chambers points out that the students, the men of science who make permanent contributions to the world's advancement, do not spend their efforts in merely discrediting existing means and methods. For instance, those who invented and developed the agencies of modern transportation never wasted any time conducting a campaign against the


ox-cart. Machinery is fabricated by man to perform functions which he regards as necessary and desirable, and is readily discarded as soon as man develops a new type which will perform those functions more satisfactorily. The war system of settling international disputes will be used until man finds a better means to maintain national security. The bitterest kind of opposition to military training will not avail until a better means of settling international differences is devised to take the place of war as a last resort.



The virulent and emotional attacks made against the government's program of military training might seem to call for Rooseveltian vigor in support of the government in this project.

It seems to us, however, that the serious citizen would prefer the sort of unimpassioned scientific analysis and appraisal that Mr. Chambers has made of the status of military training in American Universities.

The Spartans had the right idea as far as they went; a nation's insurance must consist of its own able-bodied citizens; like those of Sparta, the walls of our nation are our own young men, but the component parts of the walls must be something better than "gold bricks."



PART I
HISTORICAL SKETCH

CHAPTER I

The Legal Bases and Officially Expressed Purposes, 1862-1927.

Instruction in military science as a recognized part of the curricula of colleges and universities is not a new thing in the United States. The familiar Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862, providing for liberal grants of public lands to the states which might elect to take under its provisions, is the statutory mandate for the inclusion of military training in the courses of instruction in the "land-grant colleges," of which there were sixty-nine¹ in 1925, scattered from coast to coast, and including some of the country's leading universities. Section four of this act, as approved by President Lincoln July 2, 1862, provides that the interest of the funds obtained from the sale of public lands by the states which elect to accept the benefits of the act

"shall be inviolably appropriated . . . to the endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college, where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such manner as the Legislatures of the States may respectively prescribe, in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life."

An exposition of the reasons for the insertion of the clause in which we are here primarily interested may be found in the words of Representative Justin S. Morrill of Vermont, author of the act, in a speech on the floor of the House in advocacy of its passage:

"Something of military instruction has been incorporated in the bill in consequence of a new conviction of its necessity forced upon the attention of the loyal States by the history of the past year. A total unpreparedness presents too many temptations, even to a foe otherwise weak. The national school at West Point may suffice for the Regular Army in ordinary years of Peace, but it is wholly inadequate when a large army is to be suddenly put into service. If we ever expect to reduce

**Military
Science not
new in civil
institutions.**

**Purpose of
the military
feature of
Morrill Act.**

**Total unpre-
paredness de-
nominated
folly.**

**Opposition to
a large stand-
ing army.**

¹One in each state (except Massachusetts, where there are two), one each in Porto Rico, Hawaii and Alaska, and seventeen, exclusively for colored students, in as many Southern States.—U. S. Bur. of Education, Bul. No. 44. *Statistics of Land-Grant Colleges.* 1925.

"Sheer ignorance of military art" decried.

the Army to its old dimensions and again rely on the volunteer system for defense, each state must have the means within itself to organize and officer its own force. . . . These colleges founded in every state will . . . to some extent guard against the sheer ignorance of all military art which shrouded the country, and especially the North, at the time when the tocsin of war sounded at Fort Sumter."

The above two excerpts indicate that provision for military instruction in civil educational institutions on a national scale is at least sixty-five years old, and that its official purpose from the beginning has been the same, *viz.*: to equip selected college men with the knowledge and experience necessary to enable them quickly to qualify as officers in a possible emergency army.¹

The National Defense Act, 1916 and 1920.

The R.O.T.C.

Establishing of units optional for institutions.

Number of units limited:

1. By the fact that their establishment is voluntary.

2. By amount of funds appropriated.

Today this instruction is carried on in accordance with certain sections of the National Defense Act, approved by President Wilson June 3, 1916, and as amended later, particularly by an act approved June 4, 1920. This act (Sections 40-47c) provides for the organization of units of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps in civil educational institutions when the authorities of such institutions voluntarily apply to the Secretary of War for the establishment of such units, and are able to show that their institutions are able to meet the requirements as to the number² of students to receive instruction and as to other matters specified in the act. The number of R.O.T.C. units actually established is limited to the number voluntarily requested by the heads of institutions, and in fact is even more closely limited by the amount of the funds made available for the purpose by the periodic appropriation acts. Recently the War Department has been forced to disapprove a number of requests for the establishment of additional units solely on account of lack of available funds for the purpose.³

Section 55c of the National Defense Act provides for coöperation of the War Department in the maintenance of a type of military instruction in certain institutions not maintaining units of the R.O.T.C. Most of these institutions are unable to fulfill the requirements for the establishment of R.O.T.C. units, and consequently have

¹ See p. 15 for official statement of purpose, 1924.

² One hundred is the minimum for an Infantry, Cavalry, or Field Artillery unit; fifty for units of other branches.

³ Davis, Robert C., The Adjutant General of the Army, Letter to M. M. Chambers, Sept. 2, 1926.

to be content with a somewhat less effective form of organization for military instruction.

Maintenance of units of the R.O.T.C. in certain classes of educational institutions not of college or university rank is also provided for by the terms of the above mentioned sections of the National Defense Act. A limited number of such units are maintained at present in certain "essentially military schools" and in a few public high schools.¹

Military instruction in these classes of schools is without the scope of our present investigation, however. In the present section we are primarily concerned with the officially expressed purposes of R.O.T.C. training in colleges and universities, for purposes of comparison with the purposes conceived by Representative Morrill more than two generations ago, and advanced as the *raison d' être* of his provision for military instruction. In the Army Regulations of 1924 governing the administration and training of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps the following statement of purposes occurs:²

"Object.—The primary object of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps is to provide systematic military training at civil educational institutions for the purpose of qualifying selected students of such institutions for appointments as reserve officers in the military forces of the United States: the Reserve Officers' Training Corps is, therefore, an important agency in making effective the plan for national defense.

"Educational Aim.—The Reserve Officers' Training Corps will add to the educational resources of schools and colleges and will give to the student a training which will be as valuable to him in his industrial or professional career as it would be should the Nation call upon him to act as a leader in its defensive forces."

It will at once be seen that there is no essential difference between the primary object stated above and the object conceived by the author of the Morrill Act in 1862. The "Educational Aim," added as an incidental, is of course not new, and was undoubtedly in the mind of Representative Morrill, since the educational value of efficiently conducted military instruction, though questioned in some quarters³ today, has been long accepted.

R.O.T.C. in some "essentially military schools."

A few public high schools.

Objects and aims.

To qualify potential military leaders.

To make effective the plan for national defense.

Incidentally to provide training valuable in civil life.

Continuity of purpose.

¹Fifty-four high schools, with a total enrollment in military science of 31,472 students. (1925-1926).

²Army Regulations 145-10, Dec. 15, 1924, Pars. 2 and 3.

³See Commission on International Justice and Good Will of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, *Military Training in Schools and Colleges*, pp. 12-13, for "Opinions of Educators who Oppose Military Training."

Indeed, the common association between the words "education" and "ignorance" will at once call to mind the "sheer ignorance of all military art" which Mr. Morrill deplored; and it is conceivable that he was thinking of the knowledge of the "military art" not only as indispensable in time of great public danger, but also as a potent means

"to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life."

Educational aim not new.

Questions as to the educational value of the training are for later discussion,¹ but here we may note that the educational aim is not newly associated with military instruction.

Likewise, Mr. Morrill's preference for quick reduction of large emergency military forces to the traditionally small numbers of the small Regular Army persists today, and is upheld by the present National Defense Act which provides for a maximum of 280,000² men in the regular peace-time establishment,³ and places the main reliance for defense in an emergency on a hastily mobilized citizen army, in accordance with Anglo-Saxon non-militaristic tradition. His desire that

"each state must have within itself the means to organize and officer its own force"

State basis to national basis an inevitable change.

would in these days of the diminishing sphere of state activity in comparison with the ever-expanding control of the national government in practically every department of government activity, no doubt be voiced for the nation rather than for the individual states. This the present National Defense Act does in its provision for an Officers' Reserve Corps (Secs. 37, 37a, and 38) to consist of civilians not subject to call to active duty for more than fifteen days in any calendar year without their consent, except in the event of a major national emergency. This civilian Corps is very clearly an agency for effectuating the wish that we might have the "means to organize and officer" an emergency force. Without doubt Representative Morrill, if he were living today, would be immensely pleased that the selected graduates of his land-grant colleges who have qualified as officers

National Defense Act provides more effective means for accomplishing old purpose.

¹ See Part Three.

² Sec. 2, National Defense Act, as amended.

³ The number of men in the Regular Army at present does not exceed 125,000, on account of the limited amount of funds appropriated for its maintenance.

are now given an opportunity to accept commissions in a civilian reserve corps which provides the rudiments of organization that will make their leadership all the more promptly effective if their services as military leaders are ever required. To summarize briefly, we may say that there has been no essential change in the official purposes of military instruction in civil educational institutions in the United States for sixty-five years. The wisdom or folly of those purposes is a matter not for discussion in the present chapter; but it does appear that at least from the angle of the purposes officially set forth, military instruction is not the new and "surprising thing" that it is painted in a current pamphlet on the subject.¹ If there is anything new and surprising in the present status of such instruction, it is not in its official purposes. They are, or should be, well known, for they have been a part of our public policy and public records for more than half a century. There is no new element in them. The only question that can be properly raised concerning them is the question of their propriety in the present state of the affairs of mankind; whether humanity has progressed to the point where such purposes need not or ought not to be a part of the public policy of a country such as ours. That question is reserved for a later chapter.²

Objects not
new and
"surprising."

Only proper
question is of
propriety in
light of pres-
ent world
status.

¹ Lane, Winthrop D., *Military Training in Schools and Colleges of the U. S.* 2nd Ed., March 1926, p. 5.

² Chap. IV.

CHAPTER II

The Nature, Scope, and Extent of the Instruction, 1862-1914

An examination of the laws and regulations under which military instruction in civil institutions was actually offered prior to 1914, and a truthful exposition of the actual nature of the instruction will reveal the fact that there has been an unbroken continuity of policy in this respect, just as there has been consistency of officially expressed purposes, as has been shown in the preceding chapter. In brief, the policy has always been to make the instruction real, undisguised preparation for military leadership of as high a quality as possible under the circumstances, and conforming as nearly as possible to the most advanced developments in the field of military science at the particular time. Like any other department of a university, the military department has always been under the obligation of keeping abreast of the best contemporary thought in its field, and of fitting its instruction to the changing needs of the times. With this end in view certain provisions concerning the quality of the teaching personnel, the amount of equipment, the courses of study, and the amount of time devoted to them have long been made by the national government. The detailing of officers and non-commissioned officers of the Regular Army as instructors, the issuing of arms, ammunition, text-books and numerous accessory equipment for the use of the students, and the prescription of minimum courses of study and time allowances are all features of long standing.

Section 1225, Revised Statutes of the U. S., as amended by an act approved September 26, 1888, authorized the President to detail not to exceed fifty officers of the Army and ten officers of the Navy as professors of military science and tactics in civil educational institutions, in addition to the number of officers of the Engineer Corps of the Navy already serving as professors in certain scientific schools and colleges, as provided by an act approved February 26, 1879. One such officer was to be detailed to each institution

“having a capacity to educate at the same time not less than one hundred and fifty male students”

Continuous adherence to one policy regarding nature and quality of instruction.

Undisguised military science, up-to-date.

As efficient, inclusive and progressive as possible.

Teaching personnel, text-books, and concrete aids to instruction always provided.

Detail of Army Officers, 1888.

Apportioned first to land-grant colleges.

on its own application therefor, subject to the stipulation that the officers so detailed should be apportioned throughout the United States first to the colleges established under the provisions of the Morrill Act, and after that, to other similar institutions applying for them, in the various states,

Then to other civil institutions.

“as nearly as may be practicable, according to population.”

This section also authorizes the Secretary of War

Issue of Ordnance and ordnance stores.

“to issue at his discretion and under proper regulations to be prescribed by him out of ordnance and ordnance stores belonging to the Government, and which can be spared for that purpose, such number of the same as may appear to be required for military instruction and practice by the students of any college or university under the provisions of this section . . . and to any college or university at which a retired officer of the Army may be assigned as provided by section 1260 of the Revised Statutes.”

Successive increases in number of officers authorized.

The above section was amended by successive acts increasing the number of officers to be detailed to eighty-five¹ and to one hundred and ten,² and, in 1904, by an act authorizing the President to detail in addition to the detail of such officers as had been previously authorized,

Additional retired officers authorized, 1904.

“such retired officers and non-commissioned officers of the Army and Navy of the United States as in his judgment may be required for that purpose to act as instructors in military drill and tactics in schools in the United States and Territories where such instructions shall have been authorized by the educational authorities thereof, and where the services of such instructors shall have been applied for by said authorities.”

Additional ordnance

Section three of the same act authorized the Secretary of War to issue suitable amounts of ordnance and ordnance stores to the schools that might elect to take advantage of its provisions.

Duties of officers and non-commissioned officers.

The following is an excerpt from a summary of the War Department orders in force at that time governing the duties of the professor of military science and tactics at a civil institution, inserted here verbatim because no material change has ever been made in them, and their similarity to the orders now in force³ is notable:

Residence at institution.

“The officer detailed as professor of military science and tactics must reside at or near the institution to which

¹ Act approved January 13, 1891.

² Act approved November 3, 1893.

³ See Army Regulations 145-10, December 15, 1924.

assigned, and when in the performance of his military duties appears in proper uniform.

"In his relations to the institution, he observes the general usages and regulations therein established affecting the duties and obligations of other members of the faculty. He performs no duties other than those of instructor in military science . . . except by special permission of the War Department.

"It is the duty of the professor of military science and tactics to enforce proper discipline at all times when students are under military instruction, and in case of serious breaches of discipline or misconduct to report the same to the proper authorities of the institution, according to its established methods. In case no suitable action is taken by the authorities of the institution, he reports the facts to the Adjutant General of the Army."¹

The same orders prescribed the duties of authorized non-commissioned officers as assistants to the professors of military science and tactics in similar terms, corresponding to the relative dignity and importance of their rank and position.

It was further provided that students under military instruction be organized into companies, battalions, and regiments of infantry, the organization, drill and administration of which must conform, as far as possible, to those of the Army; and that all rules and orders relating to the organization and government of the military students, including the appointment, promotion and change of cadet officers, be made by the professor of military science and tactics after being approved by the chief administrative officer of the institution.

Identical War Department orders are in force at the present time.² Nor is the prescription of the minimum course of instruction a new feature. At least three hours per week in the regular schedule of studies was required to be provided for instruction in the military department,³ and the following groups of military subjects constituted the minimum course of instruction where a professor of military science and tactics was detailed:⁴

Infantry Drill Regulations—School of the Soldier, School of the Squad, School of the Company, Intrenchments.

**Proper
Uniform.**

**A member of
the faculty.**

**Duties exclu-
sively military.**

**Responsible
for discipline,**

**1. To the au-
thorities of the
institution and
2. To the
A.G. of the
Army.**

**Duties of non-
commissioned
assistants to
P.M.S. & T.**

**Military
organization
of students.**

**Administra-
tive orders
subject to
approval by
the head of the
institution.**

**Prescribed
time allotment
and minimum
course of
instruction.**

I.D.R.

¹Reeves, Ira L. *Military Education in the United States*. (1914) p. 67.

²Army Regulations No. 145-10, December 15, 1924, Pars. 5, 6, and 28-38 incl.

³Equivalent of 84 one-hour periods per year for at least two years was the minimum requirement.

⁴Reeves, Ira L., *op. cit.*, p. 69.

F.S.R.

Field-Service Regulations—The Service of Information. The Service of Security.

Small Arms Firing.

Small-Arms Firing Regulations—Instruction preliminary to gallery and range practice. Gallery practice. Range practice when a range can be secured.

Marches and Camps.

Miscellaneous—Company administration. Camp sanitation. Military map reading. Annual practice march and encampment whenever practicable.

Military training: not mere physical drill.**Annual War Department Inspection.**

Further detailed information will not be necessary to demonstrate that the instruction was as closely supervised by the War Department as it is today, and that in every institution it was real military training, and not a mere perfunctory physical drill, as a mistaken contemporary pamphleteer erroneously asserts.¹ Annual War Department inspections of each unit, and subsequent rating of the institutions on a scale of the efficiency of their units has always been the rule. Issue of arms and equipment of numerous kinds, and of military text-books, has always been regarded as necessary and proper to promote the efficiency of the training. To avoid wearisome detail we may set forth the significant fact that as many as 120 rounds of .30 rifle ball cartridges might be issued annually for the use of each student² in addition to 60 rounds of caliber .22 cartridges; that the number of different articles of individual and collective equipment authorized to be issued runs into scores; and that the War Department allowance of text-books and blank forms for each student company (ordinarily numbering about fifty students) totaled 134 separate documents, about half of which were volumes of substantial size, such as Army Regulations,³ Field Service Regulations, and others.

The foregoing facts are adduced at this point merely for the purpose of refuting certain current statements that create a fallacious notion of the profound changes that are alleged to have occurred in the character of university military training. Such statements as

“All land-grant schools have, therefore, ever since (1862) offered . . . military instruction to their students . . . but this was little more than a kind of military physical drill and was not taken seriously by the military authorities of the government of the United States.”⁴

Current erroneous statements.

and

“All this was changed, however, in 1916” . . .

¹ Lane, W. D. *op. cit.*, p. 8.

² Reeves, I. L. *op. cit.*, p. 74-78.

³ Always a volume of several hundred pages.

⁴ Lane, W. D. *loc. cit.*

and

“The purpose and character of military training in schools and colleges under the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps are quite different from the simple drill of earlier days.”¹

seem to be without sufficient basis in fact when the full truth is known. There is not a single feature in the purpose or general character of the training as it is carried on today that does not date well back into the nineteenth century. Of course there have been not inconsiderable changes in the training manuals, to keep them abreast of the constantly changing technique of warfare. The science of military leadership, like any other science, is a dynamic, growing, ever-changing thing. But the essential character of the instruction—which is and always has been frankly designed to prepare college men for effective service as military leaders under the conditions which they may conceivably be called upon to face—is absolutely unchanged. There is ground for the belief that the efficiency of the instruction has been enhanced since the World War period, on account of the larger number of experienced officers available for detail, and numerous other factors. But, granted that the purpose and general character of the work are legitimate and desirable, evidences of increased efficiency can surely be productive of nothing but gratification. Surely they ought not to be hastily interpreted as indicating a sinister change in the whole purpose and character of the instruction, as apparently they have been interpreted by the writers last quoted.

The facts concerning the extent of the training in the pre-war period are also illuminating. Statistics compiled for the academic year 1912-1913² show that Regular Army officers were detailed to fifty-two land-grant colleges which enrolled a total of 23,864 students in military science. In addition 2,426 students received instruction in military science in sixteen additional land-grant institutions maintained for negroes only. Officers were also detailed to thirty-nine institutions other than the land-grant colleges, each of which enrolled more than one hundred students in military science. Most of these latter were “essentially military schools,” though there are some notable exceptions, such as Concordia College

Purpose and essential character of instruction absolutely unchanged.

Efficiency increased,

¹ Fed. Council of Churches of Christ. *op. cit.*, p. 5.

² Reeves. *op. cit.*, p. 108 ff.

(Ft. Wayne, Indiana), the University of Notre Dame, Ohio Northern University, Wilberforce University, the University of Washington, and the Kamehameha Schools of Hawaii. Lastly, six institutions were giving the instruction in accordance with approximately the same War Department standards and supervision, except that their professors of military science and tactics were retired officers of the Army, instead of officers on the active list.

Approximately
thirty thou-
sand students
in military
instruction,
1912-1913.

Typical
units, 1914.

Infantry,
field artillery,
hospital corps,
signal corps.

Annual
camp.

Accurate figures showing the exact number of students enrolled are difficult to obtain but since it is known that the land-grant institutions alone had a total of 26,390 undergoing military instruction, it is safe to say that the total of all students receiving such instruction in all institutions in the academic year 1912-1913 ran well over thirty thousand. In 1925-1926 there were 80,009¹ students in the R.O.T.C. in 125 colleges and universities. When it is borne in mind that the total enrollment figures for these institutions were more than doubled during the same period² there does not appear to have been any very vastly disproportionate increase in the number of students receiving military instruction during that period. Careful consideration of comparative statistics is reserved for the next chapter of this book. To complete the present section we need only to glance at the military units in one or two typical universities in 1914, for purposes of later comparison. The University of Minnesota had 1200 students in military science, organized as two regiments of infantry, a battery of field artillery, a hospital corps detachment and a signal corps detachment. An annual eight-day field encampment was a part of the work.³ Seven institutions had units enrolling more than one thousand students each.⁴ The University of Illinois, with the largest unit in the country, had 1737 cadets, and instruction was given in infantry, artillery, and signal corps. There was a military band of 100 men, a "second band" of sixty, and a trumpet and drum corps of 200. The almost universal practice was to require all physically fit male students to take military training at least two years, and the

¹ Summerall, Maj. Gen. Charles P. *Cur. Hist. Mag.*, Vol. 24, April 1926, p. 31-34.

² U. S. Bur. of Ed., Bul. No. 45. 1925. *Statistics of Universities, Colleges and Professional Schools, 1923-24*. Page 4, shows the following total enrollments: 1910—332,696; 1924—726,124.

³ Reeves. *op. cit.*, p. 130.

⁴ The universities of California, Illinois, Michigan A. C., Minnesota, Mississippi A. & M., Ohio State and Pennsylvania State.

question of the propriety of the compulsory feature seems not to have arisen; at least there is no evidence of any widespread serious discussion of it until the World War period. It is safe to say that it was not a matter of serious interest until the beginning of the rather acrimonious public discussion of preparedness in general in 1916; that even then it was a relatively little discussed phase of the much larger general question.

The somewhat tedious array of facts in this and the preceding chapter seem to point to the conclusion that every significant feature of the present system of military instruction in colleges and universities had its counterpart in the system which was in existence on practically an equivalent scale one, two, three, and four decades ago, and which had its origin in substantially equivalent form more than half a century since. A more detailed resume of its development in the decade since the World War period, with comparative statistics, is the subject-matter of the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

Development Since 1914: The Current Situation

The facts concerning the relative change in the numbers of students enrolled in military science in the land-grant institutions during the decade between the academic years 1912-1913 and 1922-1923 will be of interest at this point. The first two horizontal lines in the following table (Table I) are reproduced from U. S. Bureau of Education Bulletin No. 19, 1925, "Statistics of Land-Grant Colleges, year ending June 30, 1923," page 8, Table 1. The third line, setting forth percentages, has been added:

TABLE I

ENROLLMENT IN MILITARY SCIENCE IN LAND-GRANT INSTITUTIONS
1912-13 to 1922-23

Comparative statistics of all land-grant colleges (white and colored)			
Enrollment	1912-13	1917-18	1922-23
Total of all students.....	99,266	124,253	239,830
Total of students in Military Science	25,230	32,033	42,140
Percentage of total of all students who were receiving Military instruction	25.4	25.7	17.5

Relative numbers of students receiving military instruction in land-grant institutions, 1913 and 1923.

It is clear that the military departments in the land-grant colleges had enrolled a substantially smaller percentage of the whole student body in those institutions in 1922-23 than had been the case ten years previously.

To include the whole picture, however, the reader is referred to the next following table (Table II), showing the figures for approximately the same period for all institutions of college or university rank in the United States:

Decrease in relative enrollment in military science in land-grant institutions.

TABLE II

ENROLLMENT IN MILITARY SCIENCE IN ALL INSTITUTIONS
OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY RANK,
1915-16 and 1923-24

All Colleges and Universities in the United States		
Enrollment	1915-16	1923-24
Total of all students.....	259,511	726,124
Total of all male students.....	164,075	457,701
Total of students in Military Science.	32,313	74,513
Percentage of total of all students who were receiving military instruction	12.5	10.3
Percentage of total of all male students who were receiving military instruction	19.7	16.3

While the data heretofore presented show that there has been no unprecedented increase in the relative number of students enrolled in Military Science, it may be mentioned that the number of officers of the regular army detailed to duty as instructors in the Military Departments of universities has undergone a more than proportionate increase since the World War period. The records of the War Department showed some 793 officers and 963 enlisted men detailed to this duty for the academic year 1925-26. As is explained in a later chapter¹ of this book, a large proportion of the enlisted men so detailed are not assigned to instructional duties, but to routine duty such as record keeping and to mechanical duties involved in the care of the large and varied stores of military equipment which are allotted to the R.O.T.C. for the purpose of making the instruction offered more concrete and practical. Invariably the commissioned officers assigned to duty at universities do share in the instructional work and have also with them a selected number of the non-commissioned officers so assigned. If the legitimacy of the purpose of the instruction be granted, the relative increase in the number of officer instructors will occasion no alarm but on the contrary will be noted with satisfaction because if the instruction is to be given at all, it ought to be given in a manner as efficient as possible, and the addition of more selected officers to the instructional staffs will not appear undesirable. The increase in officer personnel may be accounted for by the fact that the War Department naturally has the above expressed attitude toward the instruction, plus the fact that the drastic reduction in the active military forces immediately following the end of the war gave an opportunity for the release of a considerable number of capable officers from duty with troops in the regular military establishment. In order to retain and utilize to the best advantage the services of these officers in so far as Congressional appropriations for their salaries and maintenance would permit, the War Department assigned many of them to duty with the R.O.T.C. When these facts are understood it does not appear that the increase in the instructor personnel of R.O.T.C. units need necessarily be interpreted as the beginning of a sinister "War Department Drive" to militarize our colleges.

Reason
for increase
in number of
instructors.

¹ Chap. IV.

Military instruction is now given in a total of two hundred twenty-four institutions, one hundred twenty-five of which are colleges and universities, fifty-four high schools, thirty-eight essentially military schools, and seven other institutions. A list of institutions of college and university rank now offering military training is here inserted:

Approximate
present
extent.

- *Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, College Station, Texas.
- *Agricultural College of Utah, Logan.
- *Albany Medical School, Albany.
- Baylor University, Dallas, Texas.
- Boston University, Boston, Mass.
- *California Institute of Technology, Pasadena.
- Campion College, Prairie du Chien, Wis.
- Carlisle School, Bamberg, S. C.
- Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh, Pa.
- *Clemson Agricultural College, Clemson, S. C.
- *Coe College, Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
- *Colorado Agricultural College, Ft. Collins, Colo.
- College of the City of New York.
- *Connecticut Agricultural College, Storrs, Conn.
- *Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
- *Creighton University, Omaha, Neb.
- *Davidson College, Davidson, N. C.
- Denison University, Granville, Ohio.
- *DePauw University, Greencastle, Ind.
- *Drexel Institute, Philadelphia.
- Emory University, Atlanta, Ga.
- Fairmount College, Wichita, Kan.
- *Georgetown University, Washington, D. C. (Medical School).
- *Georgia School of Technology, Atlanta, Ga.
- George Washington University, (Medical School) Washington, D. C.
- Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, Pa.
- Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
- *Howard University, Washington, D. C.
- *Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.
- *Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa.
- Jefferson Medical College, Philadelphia, Pa.
- Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
- *Kansas State Agricultural College, Manhattan.
- Knox College, Galesburg, Ill.
- Lafayette College, Easton, Pa.
- *Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pa.
- Leland Stanford University, Stanford University, Cal.
- Little Rock College, Little Rock, Ark.
- *Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, La.
- Loyola College, Los Angeles, Cal.
- *Massachusetts Agricultural College, Amherst, Mass.

*Military Science compulsory for all male Freshmen and Sophomores *unless* excused for reasons deemed sufficient by the authorities of the institution.

- *Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge.
- Medical College of Virginia, Richmond.
- *Michigan Agricultural College, East Lansing.
- Mississippi Agricultural and Mechanical College, Columbus.
- *Missouri State School of Mines, Columbia.
- *Montana State College of Agriculture and Mech. Arts, Bozeman.
- *Municipal University of Akron, Ohio.
- *New Mexico College of Agriculture and Mech. Arts, State College, New Mexico.
- *New York University, New York City.
- *North Carolina State College of Agriculture and Engineering, Raleigh, N. C.
- *North Dakota Agricultural College, Fargo.
- *North Georgia Agricultural College, Dahlonega, Ga.
- North Pacific College of Oregon, School of Dentistry, Portland.
- Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
- *Ohio State University, Columbus.
- *Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, Stillwater.
- *Oregon Agricultural College, Corvallis.
- Ouachita College, Arkadelphia, Ark.
- *Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pa.
- Pomona College, Claremont, Cal.
- *Presbyterian College of South Carolina, Clinton.
- Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
- *Purdue University, Lafayette, Ind.
- *Rhode Island State College, Kingston, R. I.
- Ripon College, Ripon, Wis.
- *Rose Polytechnic Institute, Terre Haute, Ind.
- Rush Medical School, Chicago, Ill.
- *Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N. J.
- *South Dakota State College, Brookings.
- *State College of Mines, Golden, Colo.
- *State University of Iowa, Iowa City.
- *St. John's College, Annapolis, Md.
- St. Louis University (School of Medicine) St. Louis.
- Syracuse University, Syracuse, N. Y.
- *University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa.
- *University of Arizona, Tucson.
- *University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.
- University of Buffalo, Buffalo, N. Y.
- *University of California, Berkeley.
- University of Chicago, Chicago.
- *University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati.
- *University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio.
- *University of Delaware, Newark.
- *University of Florida, Gainesville.
- University of Hawaii, Honolulu.
- *University of Idaho, Moscow.
- *University of Illinois, Urbana.
- University of Kansas, Lawrence.
- *University of Kentucky, Lexington.
- *University of Maine, Orono.

*Military Science compulsory for all male Freshmen and Sophomores *unless* excused for reasons deemed sufficient by the authorities of the institution.

- *University of Maryland, Baltimore.
- University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
- *University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
- *University of Missouri, Columbia.
- *University of Montana, Missoula.
- *University of Nebraska, Lincoln.
- *University of Nevada, Reno.
- *University of New Hampshire, Durham.
- *University of North Dakota, Grand Forks.
- *University of Oklahoma, Norman.
- *University of Oregon, Eugene.
- University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
- University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh.
- University of Porto Rico, Rio Piedras.
- *University of South Dakota, Vermillion.
- *University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
- University of Utah, Salt Lake City.
- *University of Vermont, Burlington.
- *University of Washington, Seattle.
- *University of West Virginia, Morgantown.
- University of Wisconsin, Madison.
- *University of Wyoming, Laramie.
- Vanderbilt University (School of Medicine) Nashville, Tenn.
- *Virginia Agricultural and Mechanical College and Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg, Va.
- Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.
- Western Kentucky State Normal School, Bowling Green.
- *Western Maryland College, Westminster, Md.
- *Wilberforce University, Wilberforce, Ohio.
- Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio.
- Wofford College, Spartanburg, S. C.
- Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

*Military Science compulsory for all male Freshmen and Sophomores *unless* excused for reasons deemed sufficient by the authorities of the institution.

ARMY ROTC PROPERTY
UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

PART II
CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS

CHAPTER IV

Legitimacy of Purpose in View of the Present World Situation

The question of the propriety of military instruction for college men in view of the present world political situation arises because a considerable number of high-minded people are inclined toward the opinion that such training should be placed on a less general basis or entirely eliminated as a gesture toward disarmament and a step forward in leadership toward the accomplishment of permanent world peace. Not one of us can refuse to subscribe to the beautiful aspiration expressed in the following lines:

"It may be—ay! It shall be—
That as man toils up the rugged pathway of ascent,
Nations shall spurn the old barbaric plan,
And learn to spell the word arbitrament;
That East and West at last with one accord,
Shall end the long dominion of the sword."

No one would be guilty of lifting a finger to stay the approach of that beautiful concept. The difference of opinion is concerning means and not concerning the desirability of the ultimate end.

Essentially it may be a difference in capacity for faith. We know that faith can move mountains, and we believe that faith can lead mankind to a stage in his development where war will be a relic of the past. We must cling to that faith and cultivate it assiduously. Faith can remove war, but there are many who believe that it cannot accomplish that result within the present generation any more than it could build the Panama Canal in a day. This position is one which perhaps involves a confession of weakness. Those who take it impliedly confess that the dignity and simplicity of the statement "Faith can move mountains" needs to be qualified by the reflection that mountains are not moved in a day. But this is no place for a discussion of relative capacities for faith.

The type of faith which is most useful to man is the type that leads him to an indefatigable search for the facts in every situation. Let us see if there are any facts in the present world situation which make the further weakening of our meager defense system unwise. An

Military instruction and permanent world peace.

Faith moves mountains.

Faith will triumph ultimately.

Facts bearing on the question of further American disarmament.

Disarmament must be co-operative, not individual.

elementary knowledge of how disarmament must ultimately be accomplished seems to lead to the conclusion that such a move could accomplish little; in fact, could accomplish nothing toward the desired end. The problem of disarmament is a world problem, which when solved will be solved by coöperative action, certainly not by the individual action of any state. Something of the true relation of the United States to this world problem is set forth in the following words of Mr. Allen W. Dulles:¹

American disarmament could add nothing to European security.

"If a state is to play a decisive part in international negotiations it generally is necessary for it to make a definite contribution. The exception to this rule is when a power is called in as a mediator without having interests of its own at stake. In the matter of arms limitation, the United States is neither a mediator nor is she in a position to supply elements vitally necessary for success. . . .

"In regard to land and air armaments, we have little except good will to offer the European states to induce them to limit their forces. *We obviously are not prepared to supply that measure of security which the European powers would feel that they were foregoing by reducing their armies. . . .*"

Logic does not satisfy those who have had concrete experience.

He further points out that while it may be argued with logic that universal arms limitation would increase national security and that a mutual and corresponding reduction by all states would not affect their relative security, nevertheless these arguments do not satisfy states that have had the experience of France, Belgium, and Serbia. The following statement of M. Briand at the Washington Conference, in declining to appoint experts to consider the limitation of land forces and war material, will give an inkling of the outlook in Europe which makes it fairly clear that an individual gesture toward disarmament by the United States alone would accomplish nothing:

Briand on disarmament.

"France could not appoint an expert to take part in a committee of that nature. If a definite proposal of collaboration were advanced, if it were a question of establishing in common an international force with the duty of maintaining order, well and good—disarmament might be considered. If the peoples of the earth were as eager as was claimed to see armaments limited, their representatives had only to say: "A danger exists; we recognize it; we will share it with you shoulder to shoulder; here

¹ Dulles, Allen W. "Some Misconceptions about Disarmament." *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1927, p. 413-424.

is our signature." In this case France would fully agree to consider the problem of the limitation of armaments. But up to this time no such proposal had been heard and along these lines nothing but declarations has yet appeared. France has had realities to deal with; she had suffered them five years ago and fifty years ago. A French administration which would agree to things into which certain members of the conference would entice it would be false to its mandate. . . . France might agree to any reduction of armament, if her safety were guaranteed. If she were alone she could agree to nothing."

All this points to the conclusion that disarmament must ultimately be accomplished only after a more complete and more effective¹ machinery of international coöperation has been created and demonstrates the futility of any such lone gesture as some of our American disarmament advocates propose.

Lone gesture toward disarmament futile.

Military training for college students is sometimes decried on the ground that its existence makes for the acceptance of war as inevitable and even for the cultivation of a national aggressive spirit. It is said that the "will to war" must be supplanted by the "will to peace." Agreed, but has it been proved that military instruction fosters the "will to war"? It would appear that no objective proof of this assumption has been or can be adduced, and it is sometimes argued with equal cogency that such military instruction as is given in American colleges accomplishes the exact reverse of that assumption by fostering an aversion to war on the part of all who have had the benefit of first-hand contact with the implements of modern warfare. Final solution of the relative truth of these two different assumptions must await the test of time, but it may be said for the latter that it has the advantage of concreteness while the former is a theorem alone. Students who have been given an opportunity to hear with their own ears the roar of the field piece and the sickening whine of its projectile, and to see with their own eyes the terrible destruction wrought by that projectile; who have heard the crack of the rifle on the target range until it rang in their dreams, and who have suffered the headache that comes

Does Military instruction foster the "will to war"?

Or does it increase aversion to war?

¹ See Ogg, Frederic A. "International Sanctions and the Limitation of Armaments," in S. P. Duggan's *The League of Nations, the Principle and the Practice*, p. 112-128.

**Trainees
blood-thirsty?**

from inhaling the sulfurous fumes of explosives;¹ who have felt at first hand an inkling of the iron discipline which speedily sacrifices the individual to the mass, but which becomes absolutely essential in the prosecution of war operations; who have been instructed in the uses and destructive capabilities of every implement of modern warfare—it seems reasonable that the students who have had instruction which includes these things will not be unduly eager to precipitate themselves into the maelstrom of modern warfare, and that they may not lend their influence toward the making of an unduly aggressive national policy, at least while they or their loved ones remain subject to call for military service. No further remarks on this assumption will be made here.

**Freedom of
teaching.**

**War Depart-
ment "dic-
tation"?**

**Military In-
struction is
professional
instruction.**

There remain two minor points of difference among people who are thinking on the propriety of collegiate military training. It is sometimes asserted that our compulsory military instruction carried on by army officers under the jurisdiction of the War Department constitutes a flagrant violation of the sacred principle of the freedom of teaching in higher educational institutions. It is sometimes argued that the doctrines and principles taught are exclusively those of the War Department, and that in no other department of its instruction does a university permit "dictation" from any agency outside the university's own academic organization. The weight of this contention is considerably lessened by a realization of the fact that military training is professional training. Being professional training it is best given by instructors who are members of the profession of arms. We have heard no one object because the bulk of our law school instruction is given by lawyers; we have heard no complaint about restriction of the freedom of teaching because most of our professors of law are members of the American Bar Association, nor has there been complaint because that association to some extent establishes the minimum standards which law schools adopt. The same situation in substance is true of medi-

¹ Students who wish to become eligible for commissions in the Officers' Reserve Corps upon graduation are required to attend one six-weeks summer camp on a military reservation, where all the infantry or artillery weapons are actually used by the student-officers themselves; and all students in Military Science, whether they attend camp or not, are given concrete demonstrations of the actual employment of the weapons whenever practicable.

cal instruction, engineering instruction, and in fact any professional instruction in American universities.

Occasionally we find objection raised to the mere size of military faculties. Much ado has been made about the fact that the regular army personnel detailed to Ohio State University numbers about forty-five men. It is pointed out that few other departments of the University have an instructional force so large. Superficially this seems to indicate that undue emphasis is being placed upon military instruction. Again a closer view of the facts will permit a nearer approach to the truth. About half of the regular army personnel at an institution of this kind consists of non-commissioned officers and privates of the army who perform routine and mechanical tasks connected with the keeping of records and with the care of the extensive stores of military equipment of many kinds that must be kept on hand to make the instruction concrete and practical. The men who do the actual instructional work are especially selected officers and non-commissioned officers of superior qualifications for that work, and their numbers in proportion to the numbers of students that they are called upon to instruct are as small as those of the instructional force of any other department.¹

**The size
of military
faculties.**

**Not all of
Regular Army
personnel as-
signed to in-
structional
duties.**

Besides, discussion of the size of the military faculty seems to be somewhat beside the point. If the legitimacy of the maintenance of military instruction is admitted, then certainly there can be no objection to having that instruction carried on as efficiently as possible by as many and as capable instructors as can be obtained.

¹ About 20 officers and non-commissioned officers bear the burden of instructional work for approximately 3500 students in Military Science at Ohio State University. The ratio of one instructor to about 175 students is not large in comparison with other departments.

CHAPTER V

Compulsory or Optional

Much of the difference of opinion that is found today on the subject of collegiate military instruction ostensibly centers about the propriety of making military science a required subject for all male students who are physically fit and who do not have other valid ground for being excused from the requirement, as is now done in some eighty of the institutions now offering the subject.

It is sometimes held that required military training is contrary to American tradition, foreign to American institutions, and far afield from the worthy aims for which our institutions of higher education have been founded. For a discussion of these contentions the reader is referred to the next following chapter of this book.¹ The present chapter is limited to a brief presentation of facts which throw some light on the real meaning of the word "compulsory," as it is applied to military training in our colleges and universities.

Is the word "compulsory" to be interpreted in its most absolute sense? Is it iron-clad? Just how oppressively is the "compulsory" rule administered in the various institutions? The following table (Table III) may serve to throw some light on the degree of rigor with which "compulsion" is applied. The data therein tabulated were obtained from answers to a questionnaire mailed to the institutions in April, 1927.

The table (Table III) shows a range from 2.4 percent to 38.5 percent of the total number of students nominally subject to compulsory military training as being at present excused from the requirement for various reasons. The wide range in the percentage as well as the variety of reasons assigned for excusing students from the requirement is not surprising in view of the fact that the maintenance and administration of the compulsory rule is wholly in the hands of the local authorities of each institution. The twenty-five institutions from which the data for the foregoing table were supplied show an average of 20.3 percent or approximately one student out of every five excused from the

**One student
out of every
five excused.**

¹ Chap. VI.

TABLE III
ADMINISTRATION OF THE "COMPULSORY" RULE IN INSTITUTIONS WHERE MILITARY SCIENCE IS A REQUIRED SUBJECT

A	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
	University of Alabama	University of Arizona	California Inst. of Technology	Coe College, Cedar Rapids, Iowa	Colorado Agricultural College	Cornell University	University of Iowa	Iowa State College	University of Indiana	Massachusetts Agricultural College	Massachusetts Institute of Technology	Michigan State College	University of Maine
Total number of male students in first two years, nominally subject to compulsory military training.....	1,085	537	218	256	442	2,047	1,325	1,377	777	223	990	1,001	483
Total number of students enrolled in Military Science under the "compulsory" rule.....	809	390	191	222	391	1,667	889	1,089	676	196	815	803	428
Number excused from the requirement in Military Science for—													
a. Physical incapacity.....	69	97	10	11	13	50	65	136	49	27	20	106	50
b. Conscientious objections.....			2	2		2	1		1				
c. Foreigners not expecting to become citizens.....	2	43	10	2	4	100	2	51	4	4	34	2	3
d. Conflicts with duties as members of athletic teams.....						200	1						
e. Conflicts with necessary outside employment.....	3			4		3	26						
f. Conflicts with schedule of academic subjects.....	6		2	1		3	2						
g. Previous military training adjudged sufficient.....	188	3	2	14	3		334	97	35		16	87	2
h. Advanced age.....	11	11	1			2	2	4	12				
i. Other reasons.....	7	16		31**	31**							3	
j. Total excused for all reasons.....	276	170	27	34	20	360	433	288	101	27	170	198	55
Approximate percentage of total number of students nominally subject to compulsory military training who are excused from the requirement for all reasons.....	25.4	29.6	12.4	13.3	4.5	17.7	32.6	20.9	13.0	12.1	17.2	19.8	11.4

*Data not obtained

**Work in Military Science postponed only; not permanently excused.

TABLE III.—CONTINUED
ADMINISTRATION OF THE "COMPULSORY" RULE IN INSTITUTIONS WHERE MILITARY SCIENCE IS A REQUIRED SUBJECT

	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	B
Total number of male students in first two years, nominally subject to compulsory military training.....	*	354	1,407	340	1,401	860	1,503	1,648	211	114	267	319	
Total number of students enrolled in Military Science under the "compulsory" rule.....	3,036	305	1,022	330	943	535	924	1,155	203	104	172	279	
Number excused from the requirement in Military Science for—													
a. Physical incapacity.....	378	10	307	8	103	*	*	150	5	3	34	14	Approximate average percentage of total number of students nominally subject to compulsory military training who are excused from the requirement for all reasons.
b. Conscientious objections.....		1				*	*	1					
c. Foreigners not expecting to become citizens.....	6	3	2	1	3	*	*	87		1	4	1	
d. Conflicts with duties as members of athletic teams.....	179**					*	*						
e. Conflicts with necessary outside employment.....	74**		27			*	*				28	2	
f. Conflicts with schedule of academic subjects.....	70**		5			*	*			3		3	
g. Previous military training adjudged sufficient.....	324	35	23			*	*	150		3	22	4	
h. Advanced age.....	14		14	1	340	*	*	8			7	13	
i. Other reasons.....	378		7			*	*	97	5	10	95	3	
j. Total excused for all reasons.....	1,093	49	385	10	458	325	579	493				40	
Approximate percentage of total number of students nominally subject to compulsory military training who are excused from the requirement for all reasons.....	36.0	13.8	27.4	2.9	32.7	37.8	38.5	30.0	2.4	8.8	35.6	12.5	20.3

*Data not obtained.
**Work in Military Science postponed only; not permanently excused.

requirement of military science. This seems to indicate that the word "compulsory" as applied to college military training means about 80 percent of its commonly accepted unqualified meaning. This fact has been here adduced to permit the reader to have some factual basis for forming his conclusions as to the rigor with which compulsory military training is administered in our universities.

There seems to be little or no objection raised to the requirement of military science on the ground of oppressive administration of the requirement in any institution. Cases of bona fide student objections to the requirement are very rare. It seems that such objection as does exist to compulsory military training is grounded in more general objections to military training of any kind, rather than specifically to its compulsory feature. An examination of any of the numerous pamphlets cited in this book will readily disclose that fact.

The argument in behalf of continuance of Military Science as a required subject is so simple as to admit of very brief statement. In order to have more than a small percentage of all students enrolled in any subject in the college curriculum, it is necessary to make the subject one that is required for all students at some time during their college career. If Military Science is a desirable subject at all and if it ought to be taken by all male students, then it is fairly obvious that it must be retained as a required subject if the ideal is to be reasonably nearly attained.

CHAPTER VI

The "Militarism" of the "Pro's"

Those who oppose some of the features of compulsory military instruction profess to see in it all that is connoted by the term "militarism." In much of the pamphlet literature published by the Committee on Militarism in Education and similar agencies, those who defend our system of college military instruction are referred to as "militarists."¹

Almost always when controversial aspects of the question are under public discussion, a definition of the terms "militarism" and "militarist" is sought. It is of little avail to go to the standard dictionaries because the definition of these terms which is accepted by masters of English usage does not begin to convey all that they connote in the public mind. The association of the word "militarism" with the characteristics of the German military autocracy previous to 1918 is still strong in the public mind. While the passions engendered by the World War have been dissipated to a considerable extent, nevertheless the term "militarism" still has a very ugly meaning in the mind of every-one.

German
military
autocracy?

The term defies exact definition, or rather is susceptible of varying definitions in the minds of different individuals. To some it means a condition in public affairs in which the military authority is legally or actually superior to the civil authority. To others it means a mere over-development of the defense organs of a government out of proportion to the size and strength of its other organs. To still others it means merely a situation in which the personnel of the administration departments, charged with provision for the national defense, exercise or try to exercise an influence upon the people in favor of undue enlargement of their departments. It may mean a state of the public mind in which the achievements, past and future, of the defense arms of the government are disproportionately glorified. It may mean a state of the public mind such that cold reasoning in such matters is out-weighted by the hot emo-

Possible
definitions
of the term
"militarism"

¹ See Lane, Winthrop D. *op. cit.*, and other publications of the "Committee on Militarism in Education."

tions that are aroused whenever the employment of armed forces is earnestly discussed.

Use of term
productive
of just
resentment.

Whatever it means, assuredly its use in America as applied to American institutions is sure to be productive of resentment on the part of a large number of well-informed and earnest-minded people. There is no one in America today who is willing to be called a "militarist" because of the ugly associations of that loose and much abused term. Let the reader ask himself, whatever his station may be, what would be his reaction if he found himself denominated a "militarist." It is a safe assumption that his first impulse would be to hastily deny all of the things implied in that ugly characterization. Those who are sufficiently concerned with the fear that our present system of military instruction will lead to baneful results unless modified or discontinued, are prone to commit the error of a too generous and indiscriminate application of this distasteful term to any or all of their fellow-citizens who hold opposing views. Recently a prominent university administrator¹ in defending his opposition to compulsory military instruction, said, among other things,

"Russianizing
Prussianizing
European-
izing."

"I am an American and believe in America. I am opposed to Russianizing, Prussianizing, or Europeanizing America."

In similar vein, nearly all of the opponents of military instruction in its compulsory form or in other forms have characterized either actually or impliedly those who oppose their views as Prussians, Junkers, believers in war, apologists for blood-shed, proponents of militarism, and by the use of other intemperate terms have succeeded in needlessly wounding the feelings of their fellow-citizens and adding heat, but not light, to any controversy that may exist. The extravagance and absence of scholarly accuracy that lies in the use of such terms is apparent to any one upon a moment's reflection. That our system of military training for a group of students, who, as a whole, comprise approximately one-tenth of 1 percent of our total population,² bears any

No resemblance to
European
universal military
service.

¹ Marsh, Daniel L. President of Boston University, in *Annual Report for 1925-1926* (Vol. LI), p. 26-28. *Boston University Bulletin*, Vol. 15, November 11, 1926.

² A grand total of 120,874 students were enrolled in military science in universities, colleges, high schools and other institutions, including essentially military schools, in 1925-1926. Eighty thousand and nine of these were in colleges and universities.

noteworthy resemblance to the well-known European systems of compulsory military service for all young men, is a conception that is absurd on its face.

The fact that such so-called compulsory military instruction as we have is not made compulsory by national action, nor even by state action, but by action of the local authorities of each institution, is here significant. Rather than being a step in imitation of European systems, it is, in fact, designed to make such systems forever unnecessary in this country. It is encouraged, but not made obligatory, by the Federal Government for the purpose of providing a small nucleus of partly trained military leadership so as to achieve a minimum reasonable degree of preparedness without the maintenance of large standing armies and burdensome systems of universal compulsory military training as in Europe. Numerous citizens, who have some knowledge of the exigencies of war from first hand personal experiences, are inclined earnestly to labor for the maintenance of our military instruction on its present basis, and in so doing they perhaps deserve the charity of being regarded as being actuated by only the highest motives. It is doubtful if they deserve the ugly epithets with which certain current pamphleteers would have us characterize them.

Justification
of ugly
epithets
doubtful.

The university administrator above quoted further says, "Compulsory military training is foreign to the genius of America." That compulsory military training is an institution of more than fifty years' standing in many of our American Universities, he apparently forgets. That a department of instruction that is "foreign to the genius of America" should exist so long in American Universities and undergo a normal growth by voluntary action of university administrators in proportion to the growth in general population and in college enrollment, is a sad commentary on American higher education. The reader may judge for himself as to whether a department of instruction that has been an integral part of many American Universities for years may properly be deemed un-American. As well say that the Australian Ballot is un-American, for it has been introduced and widely adopted since the beginning of compulsory military instruction in American universities.¹ As well call the Initiative and Referendum²

¹ It was introduced in the eighties.

² Their adoption has been almost exclusively since 1900.

Too late to
attack compulsory
military instruction
as "un-American."

un-American, for their history in this country is less than half as long as the history of military instruction in colleges. Indeed, these devices were attacked at the time of their introduction as un-American. The validity of such attacks may well be discounted. It may possibly appear that it is now from a half to three-quarters of a century too late to attack compulsory military instruction as un-American.

The university administrator previously quoted further justifies his opposition to required military instruction by saying,

"I stand shoulder to shoulder with all good Americans in their opposition to war . . . this does not mean that I would not go to war when necessary . . . if America's life or ideals should be imperiled, I would advocate the conscription of human life for their defense. . . ."

This statement unfortunately carries the obvious inference that those who do not agree with the speaker are not good Americans. It will be agreed that "all good Americans" are dissatisfied with war as a means of maintaining national security, but to imply that all those who believe in the necessity of a temperate continuance of preparation for military defense are fully satisfied with war and view its destruction of life and property with complacency is quite erroneous. The distinction to be drawn is the distinction between facts as they exist and ideals that all wish to see take form. The cold facts as they exist indicate to the openminded that the necessity for war may again occur. The gentleman quoted himself admits this. In such a contingency, he would even "advocate the conscription of human life." Now we arrive at the point where his reasoning is deficient in factual basis. Were he familiar with the actual exigencies of war, he would know that the conscription of human life to be hurled into modern battle under untrained leaders, is wholesale murder of the life that has been conscripted. That a man can favor conscription for service in modern war and at the same time attack the institution which is trying to provide partially training leaders for use in such an emergency, is incomprehensible.¹ It indicates either ignorance of, or deliberate avoidance of, the facts concerning the raising and

Favor conscription but
oppose trained
leadership?

¹ This is strongly reminiscent of the Bryanesque fallacy "an army of a million men can be raised overnight."

officering of emergency military forces with which every soldier is familiar.

In the last analysis, the controversy over military training is a controversy between minimum military preparation and absolute pacifism. The gentleman above quoted says, "I am not a pacifist in the modern meaning of the term." Much as he may desire to disclaim his sympathy with peace at any price and the doctrine of absolute non-resistance, he cannot deny that he is taking a stand that would naturally weaken our available agencies of national defense at their most vital point—that of qualified military leadership. It would be well for him to clarify his thinking and take either the position of absolute pacifism or that of minimum reasonable preparedness. His present position appears untenable.

The full text of his remarks indicates that he is not primarily opposed to compulsory military training, nor to any other one feature of the present system of military instruction. He is opposed to what he calls "a high state of military preparedness," presumably such as the Government aims to be achieved under the present National Defense Act and administrative policies formulated thereunder. Witness the fact that he says,

"Some feel that a high state of military preparedness is the best guarantee against war. I do not agree with them. It seems to me that an accurate reading of history shows that military preparedness created the will to war instead of the will to peace. Just because America is rich and powerful is all the more reason why she should be an example to the rest of the world."

Set an example by doing what? By weakening her already meager defense system still further? Or perhaps the gentleman means by accomplishing complete disarmament.

Without attempting to place any too definite construction on his words, let us pause to remind him that the United States is already in a position of advanced leadership toward the ultimate ideal of world disarmament.¹ Our regular military establishment, commonly called the Regular Army, is by all odds the smallest permanent military force in proportion to total population and total wealth maintained by any fully civilized country in the world. With an army of approximately

**U. S. already
in position of
leadership
toward
disarmament.**

¹ Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armaments, 1921, and Coolidge proposal of a conference to consider means of accomplishing further limitation of armaments, 1927.

Tiny Regular Army.

125,000, maintained by a country with a total population of more than 120,000,000, we now have one trained soldier for every 1000 of population. This proportion has been aptly compared with the ratio of the police personnel maintained by the world's largest cities to their total population. In fact, our present regular army is scarcely large enough to be called a police force.

National Guard not intensively trained at war strength.

The actual strength of our National Guard is somewhat greater than that of the regular army,¹ but its personnel is only partly trained and all of its units would have to undergo about a four-fold expansion in numerical strength, the increase to be drawn from the untrained, unorganized militia, in order to be ready for duty in a major national emergency. Our Officer's Reserve Corps carries on its rolls about 83,000 names, representing in great part officers who received some training in military leadership during the last war. The greater proportion of these men have not had any active military training during the past eight years and it is now conservatively estimated that at least half of them would be unfit for duty or unable for various reasons, to respond to the Government's call for leaders in a major national emergency. Our Enlisted Reserve Corps is virtually non-existent, consisting merely of a few hundred names of qualified non-commissioned officers, a very small percentage of whom have received any training since 1919. No members of either branch of the so-called organized reserves receive any pay, nor any equipment, nor any emolument from the government except the relatively small proportion of them that receive orders for short periods of active duty for training purposes, usually not exceeding fifteen days in any one year.² Even if we were to make the false assumption that the combined personnel of the three components of the army of the United States represented anything like the equal of a balanced and trained professional military force of equal numbers, we should fail to find that they come anywhere near approaching the size of the forces maintained at present by the leading nations of the world. France, with a total population about half that of the United States, including the French colonial

Enlisted Reserve Corps virtually non-existent.

Comparative land Armaments.

¹The total strength of the National Guard was 190,112 officers and men, June 30, 1926, according to figures revised by the Militia Bureau of the War Department.

²See Army Regulations 135-10, "The Organized Reserves; General Principles."

possessions, has a regular military establishment of about 700,000 men.¹ The Red Army of Russia, according to latest advices, numbers at least 650,000² men. The armies of the British Empire, including the forces maintained by Great Britain, including the Irish Free State, with the reserve organizations and the various regular, militia and reserve units maintained by the other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the large and well-equipped and thoroughly trained Indian army, comprise a total much greater numerically than the total numerical strength of our forces, both actually and on paper.

In the matter of comparative land armaments, even the most casual observers know that we are in a position of advanced leadership in the direction of disarmament. That we can afford to allow our proportionately small defense system to be further weakened or neglected until the available machinery for the settlement of international disputes is further perfected,³ is gravely doubted by all those who have accurate knowledge either of the capabilities⁴ of such machinery as is already in existence or of the size of the military establishments currently maintained by other nations. Certainly the bugaboo of militarism is not to be seriously considered in the United States.

The mere fact that the American people never have permitted universal military training for the youth of the land and most certainly will not do so in the near future, is enough to thoroughly differentiate the American system of defense from European systems.

The opponents of our plan of giving as many as possible of our college men a training which will partly fit them to discharge their duty as military leaders if the dreaded, but nevertheless possible, necessity should arise, had best drop the odious term "militarism" and seek for one which more accurately fits the situation. The idea of the maximum military strength of peace-loving and justice-seeking America being used for purposes of aggression is unthinkable, yet that is what the term "militarism" connotes. The term "militarism" and

American system of defense wholly unlike European military systems.

¹ 668,503 according to World Almanac, 1927.

² 654,000, according to World Almanac, 1927.

³ On this matter see Geddes, Sir Auckland. "Internationalism—A Hope for the Future," in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1923, p. 107-110.

⁴ See Quigley, Harold A. *From Versailles to Locarno*. (1927).

The over-worked "anti-theoretical twins." its antithetical twin "pacifism" are both much over-worked. There are very few militarists in America and very few pacifists in the ignoble sense of that term, yet we are all pacifists in a proper sense of that term and all of us who face the facts know that despite our good intentions and the probity of our designs, the occasion may yet arise when resort to military force for purposes of defense may be required. Then let us be sensible and stop our talk of "militarism" and "pacifism" and earnestly seek to determine upon a policy which avoids either extreme and enables us to approach the future in harmony with the gradually growing tendency toward international coöperation, and at the same time gives reasonable assurance that we are prepared to play our part well and to hold our position of leadership in a world which conceivably may yet have its periods of chaos in international relations.

Possible
unfortunate
effect of talk
of "militarism"
in America.

In passing, it may be well to remark that those of us who are deploring, in the press and on the platform, alleged American militarism may be greatly retarding the progress of the world toward understanding and peace, on account of the construction which is put upon such statements when they are reported in the foreign press. This is but one example of the futility of destructive efforts toward education for world peace, which is the subject of a later chapter.

CHAPTER VII

The "Redness" of the "Anti's"

Whenever controversial phases of the subject of military instruction are under discussion, those who oppose its compulsory feature or its continuance in any form sometimes find themselves charged with being in sympathy with the element which is said to be agitating the overthrow of organized government. They are frequently denominated Communists, Bolsheviks, "Reds," agents of Soviet Russia, traitors to their country, and opponents of public order, either directly or by implication.

Persons whose convictions lead them to support military training have made extensive researches designed to show the connection between the opposition to its various features and certain well-known sources of Communistic activity in the United States.¹ That there is some truth in this alleged connection is not to be denied.² It is too well known to need proof that the familiar Lane pamphlet³ was published and distributed with the aid of funds received from the trustees of the so-called Garland fund.⁴ That some of the trustees of this fund are Communists,⁵ and that the fund is administered mainly for the purpose of advancing Communism is a well-known fact. The disgraceful escapades in which the original donor of the Garland fund has become involved are also frequently referred to and need not be described here. It is sufficient to note that the Committee on Militarism in Education in distributing the Lane pamphlet with the aid of funds from this source is in the position of an agent furthering the designs of the trustees of the Garland fund.

It is true also that numerous leaders of the Communist movement in the United States, such as William

The Lane
pamphlet
and the
Garland
Fund.

¹ On the general subject of subversive activities in the U. S., see Whitney, R. M. *The Reds in America*. And Irwin, W. H. *How Red is America?* (J. H. Sears & Co., N. Y., 1927).

² See U. S., 69th Congress, 1st Sess. "Hearing before the House Committee on Military Affairs on H. R. 8538, April 29, 30, and June 15, 1926, p. 187, ff.

³ Lane, Winthrop D., *op. cit.*

⁴ U. S. 69th Congress, *op. cit.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

Nation-wide
campaign.

Plausibly
worded
propaganda.

Z. Foster of Chicago and others will be found standing with the Committee on Militarism in Education in its position on the continuance of military training in American schools and colleges. Without doubt the fact that the committee is and has been¹ conducting a nation-wide campaign against the compulsory feature of military training in colleges and against any form of military training in high schools as a minimum program indicates that much of such discussion of military training as is current today has its origin in the activities of the trustees of the Garland fund and other Communist leaders. The connection cannot be denied; but to say that all opponents of military training or of any feature of the present system of military training are Communists, "Reds," or anything of the sort is to go too far. The propaganda distributed by the originators of the movement against military training is so plausibly worded that it readily engages the serious attention of the average reader, who is usually almost entirely unfamiliar with any of the facts regarding the history and present status of military instruction in American universities. Coming as it does at a time when the aspiration toward permanent world peace is becoming more widespread than ever before,² it readily appeals to a large class of the most excellent high-minded citizens who are sincerely desirous of doing anything that will promote in any way the achievement of that beautiful ideal. Thus it is that in every community that has been reached by the propaganda of such organizations as the Committee on Militarism in Education numbers of the community's best citizens have taken the Committee at its word, and for the time being at least have become opponents of at least some of the features of the present system of military instruction.

Now for the defenders of military instruction to brand these people as Bolsheviks and purveyors of subversive doctrines and to impugn their motives and to

¹The Committee was organized in 1923, by a group formerly closely affiliated with an earlier organization known as "The American Union against Militarism." See U. S. 69th Congress, 1st Sess., *op. cit.*, p. 187-276 for full details.

²It is doubtful that the aspiration is more general than ever before, but conditions have undoubtedly become such that it is receiving an unprecedented amount of discussion, and is probably gradually approaching nearer to realization.

accuse them of an ulterior purpose in taking the stand they do in this controversy is only pouring oil upon the fire. It is useless because it is obviously unjust and untrue to cast doubt upon the motives of these people. The sincerity of their stand ought not to be questioned. The only ground on which they can be attacked is on the ground that they are ignorant of the situation as it exists. For the most part, they will be found to have little knowledge of what military training of any kind consists, and almost invariably they will be found to possess a very hazy knowledge of just what and how and why military instruction is now carried on in American universities. Such being the case, it is only natural that they accept as truth the distorted statements of fact that are found in the Lane pamphlet and have been copied in the publications of the Commission on International Justice and Good-Will of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America,¹ and are repeated in the statements of certain paid speakers² who oppose the present system of military training.

Loose insinuations productive of much harm.

Sincerity of many opponents unquestioned.

Knowledge of facts deficient.

Enough of the misstatements in these pamphlets have been exposed in the earlier sections³ of this book to show the unreliable character of the whole. At this point an exposition of a gross misrepresentation based on ignorance rather than upon any malicious intent may not be amiss. In a speech at the University of North Dakota, during a recent national tour on which he spoke at many universities in opposition to the R.O.T.C., one Barnes⁴ attacked the truthfulness of the responsible officials of the United States War Department by asserting that they habitually declare all of our military preparation is solely for defensive war, and showed that in a publication of the War Department for the guidance of its troops in the field, offensive tactics are enjoined. The distinction between war for a defensive purpose and defensive tactics in warfare was wholly overlooked. To confuse these two conceptions is an exhibition of ignorance which would call for nothing but pity were it not for the fact that such confusion develops a gross

Gross misrepresentation.

War for defensive purpose not to be confused with defensive tactics in the field.

¹ The publications of this agency contain arguments on both sides of the question and are hence entitled to be conceded a fair degree of impartiality, but the errors of the Lane pamphlet are copied.

² Notably one Barnes, Roswell P., styled "Executive Secretary of the Committee on Militarism in Education."

³ See p. 22.

⁴ Barnes, Roswell P. *op. cit.*

misrepresentation of the facts. In discussing the question of whether or not the United States has ever waged a war for an offensive purpose, Mr. Barnes said, "Let us leave that question for the historians." Agreed, let us leave that question to the historians and not attempt to answer it here. But let us not confuse it with the totally different question of whether our troops in the field after war has been declared and has been begun are taught to use offensive or defensive tactics.

Offensive tactics may bring an early decision in the field.

It is true that regulations issued by the War Department to govern the conduct of troops in campaign after they have been uniformed, trained, equipped, and sent to the zone of operations, all for but one object, that of winning the campaign with the least possible expenditure of blood and treasure, do instruct commanders in such a situation to place their main reliance on offensive tactics. In simple words this means that troops are to be taught that they cannot win battles by waiting for the enemy to attack. They are not placed in the field merely to hold the ground which they possess, and thus prolong the struggle and magnify the loss of lives and material. They are placed in the field to win the struggle in the shortest possible time, and the ethics of that purpose cannot be questioned after the struggle has begun, when hesitation means disaster.¹

American ideal: avoid war until it becomes necessary for defensive purposes.

It is true that the instruction of advanced students in the R.O.T.C. includes some emphasis on this same matter of offensive tactics in war. But to assume that it is confused in the minds of military students with the wholly different matter of waging war for offensive purposes is plainly a false assumption. At the same time they are receiving instruction in military tactics in which the value of the offensive is emphasized, students are also receiving instruction in military history in which the fact that the American ideal has always been to avoid war until war becomes necessary for defensive purposes is stressed. Such errors as the confusing of the above two conceptions are the results of total ignorance of what military science really is and of what it contains.

Military science the science of leading men under trying conditions.

The knowledge apparently of many persons who speak on the subject is summed up in the naïve statement that military science is the science of war. The fact that military science is the science of leading men under the most trying conditions and under the most terrific pressure to win an objective that has been de-

¹ Witness the Russian debacle of 1917.

terminated to be a worthy one, with the least possible loss of life, the most valuable of all human considerations, is seldom considered at all. The fact that military science really is a science involving a tremendous mass of material such that no man could master it wholly in the space of a lifetime is given little credence. Prominent educators¹ who could not name a single subdivision of military science, and who have no knowledge of military training from personal experience have allowed themselves to be persuaded to express off-handed opinions to the effect that military training is barbaric, undemocratic, and otherwise undesirable. If these gentlemen could be prevailed upon to spend some time in a classroom in military science and to learn something of the body of knowledge with which a prospective military leader must become familiar, it is possible that they would revise their off-hand opinion of the character, content and general value of military instruction. At any rate they should hesitate to make off-hand generalizations in this field without having any personal experience in it and without having even made any objective study of it.²

Palpable as is the deviation from scholarly standards here referred to, it need not necessarily be ascribed in every case to a connection on the part of the authors of such statements with Communistic or other subversive movements. Proponents and defenders of military instruction should not commit the error of branding all opponents as sympathizers with the foes of public order. It would be well for them to keep in mind that the most effective way to attack fallacious contentions, at least in academic circles, is to attack the contentions themselves and not to cast aspersions upon the source of the contentions. The simple and wholesome rule of debate which dictates that the attack be directed at the opponent's contentions and not at the opponent himself should be followed. Loose accusations concerning the motives of one's opponents serve only to add heat to the controversy, and actually divert attention from the real

Impromptu Statements do not indicate hostility to public order.

False contentions must be attacked on basis of their merits.

¹ An off-hand remark by Dr. John Dewey, the distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University, to the effect that "military training is barbaric, undemocratic, and educationally wholly unwise" is widely quoted. Dr. Dewey has never either written or spoken at length on the subject in public.

² Dewey, Dr. John, in letter to M. M. Chambers, Jan. 25, 1927, says "I have not written at length on the subject. . . . I think you might get references by addressing the *World Tomorrow*, New York City."

Propaganda
wins sympa-
thies of busy
people until
they find
the facts.

issue at stake. Knowing this fact, those who feel called upon to defend our system of military instruction should carefully distinguish between the few known foes of public order and the larger number of well-meaning but ill-informed persons who may be found ranged in opposition. While it is true that the initial source of propaganda against military training can be traced, as above indicated, it must be also borne in mind that the very fact that it is propaganda and cleverly concocted propaganda makes it inevitable that it will for the time being influence large numbers of intelligent and high-minded but busy people who have no connection whatever with its source.

Lord Bryce, the distinguished English commentator on American political institutions, has said,¹

"The art of propaganda has been much studied in our time, and has attained a development which enables its practitioners by skillfully and sedulously supplying false or one-sided statements of fact to beguile and mislead those who have not the means nor the time to ascertain the facts for themselves. Against all these sources of error, the observer must be on his guard."

The wisdom of Lord Bryce obviously applies to the situation we are discussing here. It is then apparent that the most effective method to be used in defense of military training as now conducted is that of supplying the real facts in the situation to all who are concerned about it, and that nothing can be gained and certainly much can be lost by too free and too general use of accusations implying ulterior motives on the part of those who oppose it. The ugly terms which may properly fit the initiators of the propaganda against military instruction must be strictly confined to them.

Fact-finding
fortunately
not difficult.

Indeed it appears that the source of the propaganda is a matter of small moment in comparison with the fact of its spread, and no amount of discredit heaped upon its source will avail to prevent its spread. The solution lies in presenting the full truth and exposing the propaganda as such. This task should not necessarily be a difficult one. Dr. Alfred Zimmern has said,²

"Propaganda involves a dishonest use of the mind . . . Modern life . . . teaches us to be on our guard against those who substitute phrasemaking for thinking."

A further examination of the nature of certain contentions recently advanced on American campuses occupies the next section of this book.

¹ *Modern Democracies*. 1922.

² In the *Review of Reviews*, April, 1927, "The Geneva School of International Studies," p. 388.

PART III
FIELDS WORTHY OF
INVESTIGATION

CHAPTER VIII

Servile Obedience or Initiative in the Military Trainee

It is quite generally supposed among people whose knowledge of the content of military instruction is limited that the instruction tends strongly to stifle individual initiative. Since obedience to orders is regarded as one of the cardinal virtues of the soldier, it is hastily assumed that the development of his power of initiative is not the aim of military instruction. The idea that military instruction consists merely of routine drills, executed over and over again for securing precision and tending to reduce a man to a mere automaton is quite prevalent. On this assumption certain authorities¹ in physical education have condemned military training as a relatively poor means of promoting the physical development of the individual. As a matter of fact, the inadequacy of mere routine drills such as the Manual of Arms for promoting complete physical development is recognized by all military men. It is for this reason that the course of military instruction now given at our universities invariably contains a generous allotment of time to other types of physical training. Among the manifold duties of the modern military leader by no means the least is mastery of a thorough knowledge of calisthenics, elementary tumbling, simple field sports, competitive games, and mass games, in order that he may be able to lead and instruct his men and encourage them to participate in all these forms of athletic activity for the cultivation of their all-round physical development. This is considered one of the most important parts of military training. As early as 1914² the War Department issued a comprehensive manual of physical training in all of the aforementioned forms of physical activities as taught by the leading experts in physical training. Such physical training is an important part of military training to-day, wherever and for whatever purposes it is conducted. It is an important part of the course of instruction in the R.O.T.C., and no graduate

Obedience a cardinal virtue of the soldier.

Military instruction consists of more than mere routine drills.

Military leaders must have knowledge of physical training.

¹ See Sargent, D. A. *Physical Education*. Ginn & Co., 1906, p. 211-227.

² U. S. Army, *Manual of Physical Training*, 1914.

of the R.O.T.C. is considered a fit candidate for a commission in the Officers' Reserve Corps unless he has a satisfactory degree of ability to conduct efficiently the physical training of his command in accordance with the most up-to-date methods of physical training that have been developed. It may be that the experts who condemn routine drills as being inadequate for proper physical development have overlooked this fact.

But the matter of individual initiative, which is a matter of the spirit and therefore ever more important than physical development, remains to be discussed. The casual observer who sees a student company drilling on the campus may be pardoned for the unwarranted inference that what he observes is the major part of the course of military instruction. He may note that the drill master's voice is loud and imperative and that a machine-like precision of movement involving instantaneous obedience to the commander seems to be the chief aim of the exercise. He may be pardoned for wondering what good is to come of all this effort to convert a college man into a seeming automaton. He has heard of the overwhelming insistence upon strict obedience to orders in the military service and concludes often that the whole thing is little more than a device to enable the aggressive and domineering drill master to "lord it over" his subordinates. He concludes often that the system of training allows no room for the development or expression of individual initiative upon the part of the student; and that its aim is to crush such initiative as a prerequisite to the making of a good soldier. Nothing could be farther from the truth than these conclusions. If the reader doubts, let him ask the question of any military man with whom he may come in contact, or let him consult carefully any complete manual¹ now in use in the R.O.T.C. There was a time two generations or more ago when battles were fought by men marching in close formation within reach of the voice of their commanders, and at that time great emphasis was placed on the training of the soldier in close order movements, executed always under the eye and at the oral command of his superior in the service. The development of modern small arms and especially of the automatic weapons, including the machine-gun and the automatic rifle, has entailed a profound change in the tactics of the battle-

College
men made
automatons?

Aim of mili-
tary instruc-
tion is not
to destroy
initiative.

Mass For-
mations no
longer used
in war.

¹ *The R.O.T.C. Manual* (4 vols.), by Bond, Gary, Ellis, McMurtry and Crouch, 1921. The Johns Hopkins Press.

field. For men to face a well equipped enemy, massed in close formation as was the fashion in our Civil War, would mean the quick annihilation of the entire force by the deadly automatic small arms in the hands of the enemy. Modern battles are fought in extended order formations. When an organization enters the zone of enemy small arms fire, it must do so in deployed formation. That is, the individual members of the command must be separated from each other ordinarily by an interval of at least five yards. It will at once be seen that this places the majority of the members of even a small command beyond the reach of the eye and voice of their commander. Especially is this true if the action be taking place in wooded or rolling terrain. The cold facts of the situation require that from this point on, chief reliance must be placed upon the individual judgment and initiative of each soldier. So it is agreed by military experts of all countries that victory will perch on the banner of the army whose individual soldiers are best trained to exercise their own initiative in meeting the endlessly varying situations that may arise under battle conditions.

The whole system of military training employed by modern armies, American and foreign, has been changed and is still being changed in the direction of development of the ability of the individual soldier to use his initiative and to form his own judgment to meet new and disconcerting situations which he faces without the opportunity of waiting for orders from his superiors. A perusal of the training manuals in use in the United States Army and in the R.O.T.C. at the present time will readily disclose this trend.

But the full force of the situation as applied to the R.O.T.C. has not yet been elucidated. College men in the R.O.T.C. are being trained to be officers, not to be private soldiers. The superior advantages and the relatively high station in life which they occupy ideally fit them for military leadership, provided they receive sufficient of the rudiments of military training to enable them to assume the leadership for which they are otherwise fitted. Now all that is needed to dissipate the idea of the stifling of initiative in military instruction is a slight comprehension of the nature of the duty that these young men are being prepared for in their course of training in the R.O.T.C. They are being prepared

Change in tactics.

Reliance now must be placed on judgment and initiative of the individual soldier.

Whole system of training now designed to cultivate soldiers' power of initiative.

R.O.T.C. trains officers, not private soldiers.

**Prepared
for task of
leadership.**

**Mistakes in
the field are
costly.**

**A principle
of sound ad-
ministration
that is taught
in military
science.**

for the task of leading platoons, companies, and battalions of their fellows on the battlefield if the dreaded necessity of calling upon them for this service should ever occur. The terrible responsibilities which they may conceivably then be called upon to shoulder must not be under-estimated, nor are they ever under-estimated by the thoroughly trained regular army officers who are their instructors. It is kept constantly in mind that these young men are being trained to assume responsibilities under conditions the most trying that any man can be called upon to face, if the unwished-for contingency of war should make it necessary. They may be placed in a position such that a single mistake, either of omission or commission, may cost the lives of hundreds of their fellows. To assume that they can be trained for such responsibilities by a system that would crush their initiative is unthinkable. The training of the prospective officer from beginning to end is designed to make him capable of forming judgments under the varying conditions which he may face as a commander of men in battle. It is true that the necessity of compact organization and of punctual and strict obedience to orders from his superiors is enjoined upon him; but it must be remembered that the greater part of the time that the modern military leader spends in action will be in situations where the details of his plans and the conduct of his unit will not be prescribed for him by higher authority.¹ Field orders can cover only the general plan of action and never encroach upon the sphere of authority of subordinate commanders. This is a principle of sound administration that is observed perhaps more fully in armies than in any other human organizations. The subordinate commander receives his orders prescribing what he is expected to do, but never do his orders presume to tell him precisely how it is to be done. It is obviously impossible for written or telegraphic orders to cover any more than the most general phases of the situation which the commander of a subordinate unit may be facing. At best, they can only give him a general idea of what he is expected to accomplish. It is for him to work out on his own initiative, unaided except by

¹ All military men are familiar with the maxims, "Tell a subordinate what you want him to do, not how he is to do it," and "Do not usurp the prerogatives of your subordinate." Let the reader check this statement by inquiry.

consultation with the leaders of the subdivisions of his command, all the details of his plan of action from hour to hour. It is for him to decide, after the briefest reflection, what must be done in the face of numberless unexpected situations that arise from minute to minute. It will readily be seen that training intelligent youths in the use of their own individual initiative is, by all odds, the most important type of training for both officers and soldiers. This fact is recognized by all professional military men, especially those whose qualifications are so excellent as to lead to their selection as instructors in military science and tactics at our universities.

A visit to a classroom in Military Science, in which a discussion of any branch of the science is being conducted, will lead to the observation that the development of individual power of initiative seems to be the chief aim of modern military instruction. Especially is this true of the instruction which Junior and Senior students commonly receive in Minor Tactics, which is the science of leading small units under battle conditions.

CHAPTER IX

Efficacy of the R.O.T.C. in Developing Leadership

It is generally recognized that capacity for leadership depends upon the possession of certain qualities of the individual in addition to his possession of a sufficient knowledge to entitle him to leadership in any given field. These qualities may be developed in the individual by training. We are not doing enough for our college men if we only give them an opportunity to cram themselves with stores of information. They are entitled also to a type of instruction that will tend to develop the qualities that make for capacity for leadership. The object of university training is largely to equip young men and women with a training that will fit them to assume the responsibility of leadership among their fellow men in the varied circumstances in which they may find themselves in later life. Though it is much to be deplored, it is nevertheless a fact that those varied circumstances may include experiences in warfare for the young men of our present college generation before old age has removed them from the center of the world stage.

It has been pointed out that the primary purpose of military instruction is to prepare these young men to discharge with credit the duty that may be thrust upon them in that contingency. Fortunately, however, there are incidental purposes that appear alongside the primary one, and in fact are inseparable from it. The qualities that make for leadership on the battlefield are quite largely identical with the qualities that make for leadership anywhere. No attempt to make an accurate detailed analysis of the qualities that are essential to capacity for leadership can be made here, but we can note a few of the more generally recognized of these qualities and observe whether or not they are common requisites of leadership under any circumstances. One of these qualities consists of a certain self-confidence and easy poise in the presence of men that is not possessed to any great degree by most individuals until they have had an opportunity to acquire it. The acquisition of this poise that characterizes the capable leader seems to be largely a matter of the actual practice of leadership. This is a fact recognized by educators every-

**Leadership
requires
qualities
in addition
to knowledge.**

**Self-
confidence
and poise.**

Value of leadership training recognized.

where. They know that the college student who spends his entire time during his college career in the pursuit of mere information and neglects to take advantage of the opportunities for mingling with his fellow students and exercising such leadership among them as he may be fitted to exercise loses a considerable portion of the potential benefit of his college training. They know that his potentiality for good in the community in which he will be found in later years will be considerably reduced by the fact that he has not developed his capability for the exercise of leadership. In a certain very true sense of the phrase his light will always be under a bushel or at least it will be so until he has forced upon him the type of experience that will give him actual practice in the exercise of leadership for which he is otherwise fitted.

Public speaking.

This fact is one of the important means of justifying several well-recognized parts of university curricula. It is a potent reason for the existence of courses in public speaking in all its branches. Participation in collegiate debates, in oration contests, in literary societies, in dramatic interpretation—all these have as one of their most beneficent results the cultivation of that poise in the presence of men which marks the leader. By all odds the most important justification for the existence of most of the vast number of extra-curricular activities is the same thing. They are designed to give every student who has embryo capabilities for leadership in any phase of cultural activity a chance to develop that embryo capability by actually exercising it on the campus.

Extra-curricular activities.**Practice teaching.**

Colleges of education recognize the importance of this principle in the training of teachers. They universally require that the prospective teacher shall spend a considerable portion of time in practice teaching. This means that she is required to assume responsibility for a class of students and to acquire actual experience in carrying that responsibility and in exercising the leadership which is the teacher's obligation. The value of the various types of opportunities for the exercise of leadership in college which have just been enumerated is so generally recognized that it may well be suggested that opportunities of that type are as yet all too few in university curricula.

R.O.T.C. extends opportunities.

The R.O.T.C. course of instruction is designed to provide opportunities of this type to a large percentage of the total number of students who are enrolled in mili-

tary science. It is the universal custom in college military units to begin to place definite responsibility of leadership on students as early as the beginning of the sophomore year. Quite generally the young men who are given the responsibilities of cadet non-commissioned officers in the military unit, and are thus required to exercise command over small groups and to give elementary instruction and to have a feeling of responsibility for the state of military efficiency of the small groups under their command, are chosen from the sophomore class. Junior and Senior students are very generally commissioned as cadet officers and given command of the larger subdivisions of the unit in accordance with their relative rank. They are required to devote an increasing proportion of their time in military science to the giving of elementary instruction to the members of their respective commands. That these responsibilities are of a value to the individuals who are required to bear them to an extent scarcely equalled by the value of any other type of work in college may be suggested. It cannot be doubted that the exacting requirements of leadership in military ceremonies¹ alone are a powerful factor making for an alertness and poise that are of a value to the individual that can scarcely be overestimated. It is hardly to be doubted that the responsibility for the instruction of his subordinates which is borne by a cadet officer parallels the responsibilities borne by the practice teacher. The value of the various types of responsibility under different situations which military students in the upper three classes are required to assume is worthy of the closest investigation by educational authorities.

Cadet non-commissioned officers commonly sophomores.

Worthy of close study.

The following extract from the Army Regulations² governing the training in the senior division of the R.O.T.C. sets forth the position of the War Department in this matter:

“Leadership training—All concerned in directing Reserve Officers’ Training Corps training should keep in mind that the ultimate purpose of such training is the production of well-instructed junior reserve officers, in whom self-confidence and aggressive leadership have been developed. Leadership ability is acquired by the exercise of supervised opportunity to instruct and command. Such opportunities should be frequently and progressively afforded to all members of the Reserve Officers’ Training

¹Parades, reviews, and inspections.

²Army Regulations 145-10, “Reserve Officers’ Training Corps: Administration and Training,” par. 43.

Corps throughout their four years' course. Considerations of administration and discipline should not be permitted to limit these command opportunities to a selected group of cadet officers and cadet non-commissioned officers to the exclusion of all other students. Additional supervised instruction in leadership should be given to students naturally backward in such ability in order that the greatest possible number of students may qualify as efficient reserve officers. Individual rather than organizational training will be emphasized. The organizations created in the unit should serve the purposes of individual training. It would be in furtherance of the purposes of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps to create a considerable number of vacancies in each of the officer and non-commissioned officer grades additional to those required by tactical needs and annually to promote all members who qualify to a definite cadet military rank which would mark their progress."

It will thus be seen that the aims of the War Department toward the development of capability for leadership on the part of young men are in substantial accord with the aims of the great majority of our recognized educational authorities. If there is any essential difference which seems to invalidate the claims of the R.O.T.C. for credit as an instrument of leadership training, they remain to be set forth by some scholar who has not yet written on the subject.

CHAPTER X

The Value of Advanced Studies in Military Science as Academic Training

An investigation of the nature of advanced studies in military science in comparison with other academic subjects may be productive of some unsuspected results. Many men who stand high in various academic fields, having never made such an investigation, incline toward the unwarranted conclusion that military science does not deserve to be compared with academic subjects as a means of promoting culture. This conclusion is naturally drawn from the unfounded assumption, previously exposed, that military science consists largely of mere routine drills and that the sole qualification for military leadership is the ability to "stand up and holler at a bunch of men." An investigation of the subject matter and of the methods of teaching now in use in advanced military science will readily dissipate this false assumption. In preparing the prospective officer for his responsibility as a leader of men, the aim of the military instruction is to train him in the forming of judgments after going through a careful chain of reasoning which will minimize the possibilities of error. The methods of arriving at decisions and the methods of making solutions of problems in advanced military science as taught in our universities to-day are strikingly similar to the methods used by scholars in other fields. An exposition of the steps¹ which should ordinarily be followed in attacking a research problem in any field of human knowledge is strikingly similar to the chain of reasoning suggested to be used by student officers in the solution of tactical problems. The selection of the problem, its delimitation, the investigation of what has already been done on it and on related problems, the determination of the method of approach, the collection, tabulation, and arrangement of data, the regard for simplicity and vividness of presentation—all these considerations in the preparation of a piece of work on a research problem in an academic subject are almost exactly paralleled by the

**Solution of
problems in
military
science in-
volves schol-
arly work.**

¹ See Reeder, Ward G. *How to Write a Thesis*. Bloomington, Ill. Public School Publishing Company, 1925, and Schluter, W. C. *How to do Research Work*. New York. Prentice-Hall. 1926.

work which must be done by a prospective leader of troops in solving a problem in Minor Tactics.

Witness the discussion of the "Estimate of the Situation" in the section on the solution of tactical problems in the text-book now in use by senior students in the R.O.T.C.:¹

The "estimate of the situation."

"Being confronted with the situation the leader proceeds to think it over, to consider all its aspects, to look at it from every angle, and to determine what he should do and how to do it. This mental process is called 'the estimate of the situation.' It will be no innovation in the brain of a thinking man since, as we have observed, it is characteristic not only of tactics but of all serious affairs of life.

"The 'estimate of the situation' then is a logical process of thought culminating in a tactical decision.

"It has been found by experience that better results are obtained if this estimate is made in a certain definite order or sequence. It is not desirable to restrict or limit the mental processes, nor is it possible to do so. But when all are trained to think along definite lines, quicker, better, and more uniform results are obtained, and there is less likelihood that matters of importance will be overlooked. The program prescribed guides and assists the mental processes by insuring the consideration of all matters of importance in proper sequence, without restricting independence of thought.

Normal steps in arriving at a tactical decision.

"The sequence is as follows:

1. *The Mission.* What is to be accomplished?
2. *The Enemy.* Everything that is known or may be reasonably inferred concerning him.
3. *Our Own Forces.* This includes both the immediate command and supporting troops which might influence the decision.
4. *Conditions Favorable and Unfavorable.* The most important of these is the terrain, which always greatly influences tactical operations. Other possible conditions are weather, season, time of day, etc.
5. *Courses open.* A review of various possible methods of accomplishing the mission, with a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of each.
6. *The Decision.* A brief statement of the course of action determined upon.
7. *The Plan.* A detailed statement of the part to be played by each element of the command.

"The solution of a tactical problem may also be approached as follows:

- 1st. What task is to be accomplished? (Mission.)
- 2nd. What facilities are available to accomplish the task, and what conditions are favorable? (Our own troops, advantages afforded by the terrain, other favorable conditions.)

¹ *The R.O.T.C. Manual.* Vol. IV, Senior Course, 2nd Year Advanced, section on Tactics, p. 27.

- 3rd. What difficulties or obstacles will interfere with the accomplishment of the task? (The enemy, unfavorable features of the terrain, other unfavorable conditions.)
- 4th. In view of the facilities and difficulties what should be done to accomplish the mission and exactly how should it be done? (The decision and plan of action.)"

It is sometimes thought entirely apart from the consideration of the value of the subject matter of military training that the methods of teaching employed by army officers are entirely at variance with those employed by instructors in our best civilian educational institutions to-day. It is sometimes thought that the methods used in military service are such as have been entirely outgrown by the application of modern educational theory. A glance at the instructions to teachers of military science also found in the textbook now in use for Seniors in the R.O.T.C. hardly seems to bear out this feeling. Instructors are enjoined against the dictatorial setting up of any one solution of a problem as the one and only correct solution and are made to understand that by far the most important objective of all the work is to develop in the student the habit of independent thought. The following paragraphs on approved solutions of tactical problems give an inkling of the methods that military instructors are expected to use:¹

Military teaching not dictatorial.

Approved solutions.

" 'Approved' solutions. In the case of written problems the instructor grades the solutions and comments upon them for the benefit of his students. It is the custom also for the instructor to issue 'an approved solution' of his own. It should be impressed upon the students that this is not the only correct solution, and that a very different one might accomplish the result. Sometimes the instructor will not complete his own solution until he has reviewed those of his students. If the problem is a simple one and the solutions generally close to the mark, a few comments on the most serious mistakes observed may be sufficient, or a few of the best solutions submitted by the students may be posted for the benefit of all. This has a stimulating effect. Also students may be required to review the solutions of others.

"The following method of instruction also tends to stimulate the interest of the students. All students having handed in their written solutions, the instructor issues a solution prepared by himself. Each student is then required to write a short criticism, taking the form of a comparison between his (the student's) solution, and that

Military students write criticisms of approved solutions.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 26.

of the instructor. In this criticism the student points out wherein he considers his own solution or portions thereof, equal to or better than that of the instructor, with his reasons."

Verification
by actual
observation
desirable.

These excerpts seem to indicate that the habits of thought and the methods of instruction employed by real scholars in military science do not differ essentially from those of real scholars in any other field of knowledge. They seem to indicate that the instruction which has in a limited sense been "turned over to the War Department" is being carried on in accordance with the best known modern educational theory. A complete verification of this observation can be had perhaps only by visiting classes in military science in the institutions which now give instruction in that subject. The present writer has had the opportunity of such direct observation of the work in five¹ separate institutions within the past eight years. His limited observation has been such as to verify the statements here made.

Military in-
struction not
a mere
mechanized
process to
throttle in-
dependent
thought.

Final determination of the quality of military instruction rated in comparison with the quality of instruction in academic subjects may well be left to scholars more capable, but the present discussion can at least definitely destroy the wholly unwarranted assumption that military instruction as now carried on is merely a mechanized process designed to stifle independent thought and individual initiative and reduce the student to a mere unthinking automaton. In closing this discussion, this statement may well be buttressed by quoting the words of another scholar referring to the type of training most to be desired:²

"You must be trained by practice to remember details, to seek information, to evaluate conflicting factors, to arrive at a decision, and finally to act with force and vigor."

and from yet another:³

"The teaching of military knowledge has before all the object of bringing the student to utilize his intellectual equipment."

The study of maps, sand tables, diagrams, and landscape drawings may seem a dull and monotonous pur-

¹ Ohio Wesleyan University (1919), University of Florida, (1920), Harvard University (1920), Ohio State University (1921), and University of North Dakota (1926).

² Colby, Elbridge. *The Profession of Arms*. p. 56-74.

³ Colby, E. *op. cit.*, p. 71 (quoted from Von Moltke).

suit to the uninitiated, yet even the most casual observer will notice that to a military student it has an apparently inexplicable fascination. This is not because he has been developed into a blood-thirsty maniac, whose hands itch for a lethal weapon and who longs to try his newly acquired military knowledge in the slaughter of his fellow-men. The study of Minor Tactics is fascinating to the student because at every turn it challenges his power of individual judgment. From minute to minute as his imaginary forces progress across the map or sand table, he is confronted with new situations which test his mental resourcefulness and stimulate his mental processes in a manner comparable to that of the most abstruse academic subjects. Shells from enemy artillery are beginning to fall in dangerous proximity to his platoon. What shall he do? As his platoon reaches the crest of a hill it is fired upon by an enemy machine-gun concealed in a location 500 yards to his left front. What is his plan? As his platoon is crossing an open valley the zooming of an enemy airplane is heard. What shall be done? His platoon reaches the banks of a stream. What elements must be taken into consideration in determining when, where, and how to cross it?

Fascination of Minor Tactics.

Challenges thought.

Tests resourcefulness.

Myriad disconcerting situations.

How does he maintain communication with the commander of the larger unit of which his command is a part? How can he construct field fortifications that will enable him to hold the ground he has gained with a minimum loss of the lives of his men? These questions supply but the least inkling of the vast array of problems that are investigated and studied in all their aspects by the student of Minor Tactics. Their proper solution involves an elementary knowledge of psychology, of engineering, and a more than elementary knowledge of a hundred phases of the problem of leading men under battle conditions—a problem which tests the resourcefulness of men as few other problems can.

Further, aside from the matter of careful processes of thinking, investigation, and evaluation of facts, there is the matter of scholarly accuracy. The standards governing the form and precision with which a piece of scholarly work must be characterized are difficult of attainment and constitute in themselves an important means of improving the intellectual capability of the student. But no stylist could set forth rules as to the form of a manuscript more meticulously than do the demands

Scholarly accuracy.

Requirement of accuracy of form and phraseology of field orders.

of the military service set forth the forms for the phrasing of a field order.

The lives of hundreds of men and the fortunes of a cause for which men have gone to war may be lost as a result of the most insignificant error in the phrasing of a field order to govern the conduct of troops under battle conditions. On account of this fact, students in Military Science as early as the Sophomore year are instructed in the correct form of a field order with the most meticulous care, and throughout their course an attempt is made to give them such instruction as will enable them to guard against the commission of those small errors in committing plans to paper which may be so costly in the field.¹ There is no field of scholarship which demands of its students greater accuracy than the field of military science.

Academic credit now given for military science in representative universities.

Objective tests of the academic value of military instruction are not readily obtainable, but perhaps one of the most reliable tests at present available is the standing given to instruction in military science by representative universities at the present time as evidenced by the maximum amount of credit in military science that is permitted to be counted toward graduation. The series of tables which will be found on the following pages set forth data² collected from twenty-one representative American universities which are giving instruction in Military Science. It will be noticed that they are scattered from coast to coast, that their requirements as to the number of credit-hours required for graduation vary considerably, and that they have been grouped, in so far as possible, into groups having identical requirements. It will be observed that the data presented includes a column (column three) showing the approximate maximum percentage of the total credits required for graduation that may be offered for work taken in the Department of Military Science. A brief summary of this data appears in the pages immediately following the tables.

¹ *The R.O.T.C. Manual*. Vol. IV, Section on Tactics, p. 40-51.

² Indebtedness to Colonel William G. Doane, Professor of Military Science and Tactics, University of North Dakota, for these data is hereby acknowledged.

TABLE IV
ACADEMIC CREDIT FOR MILITARY SCIENCE
Institutions requiring a total of 120 credits for graduation.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Institution	Total credits in Military Science permitted to be counted toward graduation.	Approximate maximum percentage of total credits for graduation that may be in Military Science.	Is Military Science a required subject?	Maximum number of credits for Band.	Is creditable work in the Band an optional substitute for Military Science?
University of Illinois.....	10	8	Yes	4	Yes
University of Iowa.....	8	7	Yes	Yes
University of Pittsburgh.....	16	13	Yes	No
University of South Dakota..	12	10	Yes	Drill only
Yale University.....	24	20	No	No

TABLE V
ACADEMIC CREDIT FOR MILITARY SCIENCE
Institutions requiring a total of 124 credits for graduation.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Institution	Total credits in Military Science permitted to be counted toward graduation.	Approximate maximum percentage of total credits for graduation that may be in Military Science.	Is Military Science a required subject?	Maximum number of credits for Band.	Is creditable work in the Band an optional substitute for Military Science?
University of California.....	18	14	Yes	10	Yes
University of Missouri.....	12	10	Yes	Yes

TABLE VI
ACADEMIC CREDIT FOR MILITARY SCIENCE
Institutions requiring a total of 125 credits for graduation.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Institution	Total credits in Military Science permitted to be counted toward graduation.	Approximate maximum percentage of total credits for graduation that may be in Military Science.	Is Military Science a required subject?	Maximum number of credits for Band.	Is creditable work in the Band an optional substitute for Military Science?
Johns Hopkins University. . . .	17	14	No	No
University of North Dakota. . .	16	13	Yes	4	1 hr. wk.
Northwestern University.	16	13	No	No

TABLE VII
ACADEMIC CREDIT FOR MILITARY SCIENCE
Institutions requiring a total of 128 credits for graduation.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Institution	Total credits in Military Science permitted to be counted toward graduation.	Approximate maximum percentage of total credits for graduation that may be in Military Science.	Is Military Science a required subject?	Maximum number of credits for Band.	Is creditable work in the Band an optional substitute for Military Science?
University of Alabama.	20	15	Yes	4	Yes
University of Idaho.	20	16	Yes	Yes

TABLE VIII
ACADEMIC CREDIT FOR MILITARY SCIENCE
Institutions requiring varying numbers of credits for graduation.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Institution	Total credits in Military Science permitted to be counted toward graduation.	Approximate maximum percentage of total credits for graduation that may be in Military Science.	Is Military Science a required subject?	Maximum number of credits for Band.	Is creditable work in the Band an optional substitute for Military Science?
North Dakota Agricultural College*.....	24	12	Yes	1 hr.
Stanford University**.....	35	19	No	No
University of Wyoming*** ...	30	16	Yes	1	No

* 204 credits required for graduation.

** 180 credits required for graduation.

*** 189 credits required for graduation.

TABLE IX
ACADEMIC CREDIT FOR MILITARY SCIENCE
Institutions requiring a variable number of credits for graduation.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Institution	Total credits in Military Science permitted to be counted toward graduation.	Approximate maximum percentage of total credits for graduation that may be in Military Science.	Is Military Science a required subject?	Maximum number of credits for Band.	Is creditable work in the Band an optional substitute for Military Science?
University of Maryland*.....	18	14	Yes	No
University of Michigan**.....	12	10	No	No
University of Minnesota***...	21	10	Yes	1 hr. wk.

* 129 to 152 credits required for graduation.

** 120 to 140 credits required for graduation.

*** 180 to 204 credits required for graduation.

TABLE X
ACADEMIC CREDIT FOR MILITARY SCIENCE

Institutions requiring credits for graduation on other than the credit hour basis.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Institution	Total credits in Military Science permitted to be counted toward graduation.	Approximate maximum percentage of total credits for graduation that may be in Military Science.	Is Military Science a required subject?	Maximum number of credits for Band.	Is creditable work in the Band an optional substitute for Military Science?
University of Chicago*.....	6½ "majors"	18	No	No
Harvard University**.....	4	25	No	No
Princeton University***.....	1 "course"	25	No	No

* 36 "majors" required for graduation.

** 16 credits plus English "A" required for graduation.

*** 4 "courses" required for graduation.

The significant feature of the data just presented is the light that they throw on the esteem in which military science as an academic subject is held by the university authorities. In the next following table (Table XI), column three of the preceding table is consolidated and summarized, showing that the average maximum amount of credit in military science that may be offered in satisfaction of the requirements for graduation in the institutions under consideration is approximately 14.4 percent of the total requirement. In brief, a student may offer approximately one-seventh of his work as Military Science.

TABLE XI
ACADEMIC CREDIT FOR MILITARY SCIENCE

Approximate maximum percentage of total credits for graduation that may be in Military Science.

1	2	3	4
1	Illinois.....	8	TABLE IV
2	Iowa.....	7	
3	Pittsburgh.....	13	
4	South Dakota.....	10	
5	Yale.....	20	
6	California.....	14	TABLE V
7	Missouri.....	10	
8	Johns Hopkins.....	14	TABLE VI
9	North Dakota.....	13	
10	Northwestern.....	13	
11	Alabama.....	15	TABLE VII
12	Idaho.....	16	
13	North Dakota Agricultural College.....	12	TABLE VIII
14	Stanford.....	19	
15	Wyoming.....	16	
16	Maryland.....	14	TABLE IX
17	Michigan.....	10	
18	Minnesota.....	10	
19	Chicago.....	18	TABLE X
20	Harvard.....	25	
21	Princeton.....	25	
	Average	14.4	

PART IV
MILITARY INSTRUCTION AND
EDUCATION FOR PEACE

CHAPTER XI

Constructive Versus Destructive Efforts Toward Education for Peace

It is not to be doubted many of the opponents of military instruction are actuated principally by a desire that everything possible be done to promote the cause of permanent world peace. To this end they are inclined to think that the present "war system" must be discredited. In a public discussion on this matter recently, it was said that modern warfare depends for its success on military machinery; that we must bend supreme efforts toward the accomplishment of a gradual education to achieve dissatisfaction with the war system.

**All hail
the cause
of permanent
world peace.**

The weakness of this statement is not difficult to discern. Dissatisfaction with the war system is already universal. There has not been a word raised in its defense in any public discussion in this country in the past ten years. We need not waste effort on an attempt to achieve the thing that is already universal. What the world needs to achieve is a machinery to take the place of and perform the functions of the war system. Such machinery will be built by a constructive effort. It is not necessary to direct destructive effort toward the machinery of war for it will fall of its own weight as soon as something is constructed to take its place. And no amount of destructive effort will destroy it until a new machinery is created to perform the functions now performed by it.

Machinery does not determine function. Means do not determine ends. Machinery is fabricated by man to perform functions which he regards as necessary and desirable, and is readily discarded as soon as a new type which will perform those functions more satisfactorily is developed. We still possess facilities for producing the "machinery" of ox-cart transportation, but the fact that we may have the machinery does not make us use that method of transportation. Its machinery has disappeared from human sight except in museums, and no energy is needed to be directed into destructive effort to make it disappear. Its relegation to the limbo of things forgotten was natural and inevitable when the machinery of modern transportation was invented to

**In the long
run, means
do not deter-
mine ends.**

supersede it. So will the war system of settling international disputes disappear when the machinery of peace is perfected to a point where it will settle international disputes in a manner more satisfactory than the present day offers.

Destructive efforts against out-worn machinery of no avail until a better type supersedes it.

The students, the men of science who make permanent contributions to the world's advancement, do not spend their efforts destructively. The inventors of the agencies of modern transportation never wasted any time conducting a campaign against the ox-cart. The limitations of the ox-cart as an agency of transportation did not need to be explained. They were as familiar to everyone as are the limitations of the war system for the settlement of international disputes. It would then seem that the money and the brains that are being spent in campaigning against military training might be much better spent in campaigning for the agencies for the pacific settlement of international disputes. American students should be more interested in hearing and reading constructive expositions of the structure and functions of the League of Nations, the World Court, and their subsidiary agencies, than destructive attacks on one of the departments of instruction in our universities.

Field for constructive effort.

It is significant that many students who have expressed themselves as opposing military instruction are paradoxically enough found to be students who have little or no interest in the constructive agencies for the promotion of world peace. For example, at the University of North Dakota a student¹ who expressed such uncompromising opposition to military training as to warrant his discharge from the local unit has never been found enrolled in a course for the study of international organization which is offered in the political science department at that university. The weakness of destructive effort is a fact which the sincere advocates of world peace must recognize. They must realize that the bitterest campaign against the use of ox-carts would not have availed until a better agency of transportation was devised. It is easy to infer that the bitterest kind of opposition to military training will not avail until a better means of settling international differences is devised to take the place of war as the ultimate resort. The primary function of military training is to procure

Weakness of destructive effort must be recognized.

¹ Name withheld; verification of statements can be had from the Registrar, University of North Dakota.

a certain degree of national security. Security is demanded and will be had at any cost by the people of every nation. If it cannot be had by peaceful means, then it will be had by the cruder means which now seem to be the ultimate last resort. All this is merely a way of reiterating the obstinate fact that at the present stage of human progress the dreaded necessity of defensive war may yet conceivably be forced upon a peace-loving people. That an enlightened people should allow itself to become either unable or unwilling to rally with promptness and efficiency to the armed defense of its heritage of the ages, is scarcely within the range of credibility to the generation of men who now control the policies of the states of the world.

Security at all costs.

Bearing in mind that the plans for building the machinery of international coöperation, which are now in the process of being worked out, do not contemplate the destruction of nationalism, but only the taming of the spirit of nationalism to the point where it will "work in double harness," it may appear that the most effective efforts toward education for peace are not those designed to weaken any of our existing national institutions, such as the R.O.T.C.; but rather those which look constructively toward the wider diffusion of knowledge in the field of international relations. In short, the suitable way to alter our college curricula to meet the needs of the day would seem to be to build up our courses in such fields as International Organization, International Trade and Exchange, Diplomacy and World Politics, rather than to attack our courses in Military Science.

Constructive alteration of curricula.

As long as the existing agencies for international coöperation remain as feeble and untrustworthy as they are to-day, there is no inconsistency in the maintenance simultaneously of a sane program of education for peace and a moderate program of instruction in Military Science, such as we have at present. The conclusion is here hazarded that our present program of instruction in Military Science, on its present basis, contains enough of good for the individual student, for his country, and for the cause of permanent peace, to warrant its continuance in the favor of our leaders in education.

Military instruction not inconsistent with education for peace.

Military Science contains too much of good to be made object of destructive attack.

APPENDIX A
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

Bibliographical Essay

The seeker after original sources of information concerning the status of military instruction in American universities will go to the *United States Statutes-at-Large* for the Morrill Land Grant act of 1862 and subsequent supplementary acts, and the National Defense Act of 1916 with its subsequent amendments. The files of the United States War Department orders affecting the conduct of the instruction, under the provisions of the basic acts, issued from time to time from 1865 to the present constitute another invaluable original source. Among the most useful of these for current information are those known as *Army Regulations No. 145-10, Reserve Officers Training Corps: Administration and Training*, published December 15, 1924, and *Army Regulations No. 350-3300*, January 4, 1926, *Military Education in Schools and Colleges*.

The bulk of available source material other than what has been cited will be found unpublished in the records of the various institutions maintaining military instruction. Publications of the United States Bureau of Education, including *Statistics of Land Grant Colleges*, issued biennially, and *Statistics of Universities, Colleges, and Professional Schools*, are valuable sources of statistical information.

There is no comprehensive secondary work devoted wholly to the subject, but it has received considerable attention at the hands of pamphleteers within the past few years, and an excellent description of the status of military instruction in civilian institutions up to 1914 is contained in *Military Education in the United States*, by Captain Ira L. Reeves, published in 1914 by the Free Press Publishing Company of Burlington, Vermont. It contains chapters on military education in general, military education in land grant colleges, and military education in institutions other than land grant. Brief descriptions of the nature and extent of the instruction in practically all of the institutions offering it in that year are included in addition to enlightening excerpts from the War Department's orders affecting the training at that time.

The various training manuals issued by the War Department, covering each of the major divisions and subdivisions of the whole body of knowledge which the trained officer must master, constitute another useful source because they were the only textbooks in use in the military departments of civil institutions until about 1921. *The Manual of Military Training*, by Moss and Lang, was used in conjunction with the official training manuals in numerous institutions until the publication of the four volumes of the *R.O.T.C. Manual* (one volume for each year of the course) by P. S. Bond, E. B. Garey, O. O. Ellis, T. L. McMurray, and E. H. Grouch, in 1921, since when it has been supplanted by them. These volumes contain the first completely organized course of military instruction designed for civilian college students, and no one should attempt to understand the character of the instruction now being offered without a thorough perusal of them.

A brief secondary treatment of the subject is found in the chapter on the military educational system in the little volume, *The Profession of Arms*, by Elbridge Colby, published in 1924 by the Appleton Company. A more extensive treatment of the general subject of military education and its value is the volume *Arms and the Boy*, by L. R. Gignilliat, published by the Bobbs-Merrill Company in 1916.

Among government publications touching the subject are the *Senate Committee Print, Reserve Officers Training Corps at Educational Institutions, Statements of Presidents of Universities*, compiled by the Committee on Military Affairs of the United States Senate (James W. Wadsworth, Jr., Chairman) and published by the Sixty-Seventh Congress, second session; the *Hearings before the House Committee on Military Affairs on the Welsh Bill (H. R. 8538) April 29 and 30 and June 1, 1926*; *Opinions of Leading Citizens on Military Training in Schools and Colleges*, a multigraphed publication of the United States War Department in 1926; and *Military Education in Schools*, a similar multigraphed War Department publication of the same year.

A compilation of representative opinions is contained in the volume, *Military Training Compulsory in Schools and Colleges*, by Lamar T. Beman, published by the H. W. Wilson Company in 1926. This volume also contains briefs on controversial phases of the subject and a comprehensive classified bibliography.

Another group of sources of occasional references to the subject includes the *Transactions and Proceedings of the National Association of State Universities*; the *Proceedings of the Association of American Universities*; the *Proceedings of the American Association of Land-Grant Colleges*; and the *Proceedings of the National Education Association*. The *Proceedings of the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools*, and the similar publications of other sectional associations also yield occasional discussions of the subject.

Among the pamphlets may be listed the American Legion Leaflet of 1926, *Military Training in our Schools and Colleges—what it does for American Youth*; the National Security League's pamphlet, *Military Training—Objections and Answers*; and the Oakland, California, public schools' publication of 1923, *Reserve Officers Training Corps—Respect—Obedience—Team Work—Character*; and LeRoy F. Smith's pamphlet, *A Methodist Answers the Methodists*.

The foregoing pamphlets defend the existing systems of military instruction. It will be found to be attacked on various grounds in Winthrop D. Lane's pamphlet, revised March, 1926, *Military Training in Schools and Colleges of the United States. The Facts and an Interpretation*; a 1926 pamphlet of the Massachusetts Committee on Militarism in Education entitled *Military Training in the Schools and Colleges of Massachusetts*, compiled by Eleanor F. Cole, 14 Beacon Street, Boston; and *In Danger Zones of the Social Order*, by Sherwood Eddy and Kirby Page; published by the John H. Doran Company of New York, 1926. Periodicals and ephemeral publications dealing with the subject include the October 1926, issue of *The World Tomorrow* of New York City, entitled "Militarism in the U. S. A.", and consisting chiefly of a blatant attack on military education, and a few leaflets issued occasionally by short-lived organizations purported to consist of students opposed to military instruction at various universities.

Two recent pamphlets defending military instruction are *Why Compulsory Military Training?* by Col. William M. Mumm of Columbus, Ohio, and *Ye Shall Know the Truth*, by Fred R. Marvin of New York City.

For the convenience of the reader, an alphabetically arranged bibliography is hereto appended:

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